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Abstract
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the most widely used security protocol on the Internet.
It supports negotiation of a wide variety of cryptographic primitives through different cipher suites, various
modes of client authentication, and additional features such as renegotiation. Despite its widespread use,
only recently has the full TLS protocol been proven secure, and only the core cryptographic protocol with
no additional features. These additional features have been the cause of several practical attacks on TLS.
In 2009, Ray and Dispensa demonstrated how TLS renegotiation allows an attacker to splice together its
own session with that of a victim, resulting in a man-in-the-middle attack on TLS-reliant applications
such as HTTP. TLS was subsequently patched with two defence mechanisms for protection against this
attack.
We present the first formal treatment of renegotiation in secure channel establishment protocols. We
add optional renegotiation to the authenticated and confidential channel establishment model of Jager et
al., an adaptation of the Bellare–Rogaway authenticated key exchange model. We describe the attack
of Ray and Dispensa on TLS within our model. We show generically that the proposed fixes for TLS
offer good protection against renegotiation attacks, and give a simple new countermeasure that provides
renegotiation security for TLS even in the face of stronger adversaries.
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1 Introduction
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, the successor of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol,
provides secure channel establishment on the Internet. It is commonly used to protect information sent via
the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) on the web, and many other application layer protocols such as
email and file transfer. TLS consists of a handshake protocol, used to agree on security parameters, establish
a secret key, and authenticate the parties; and a record layer protocol, used to send encrypted data.
Despite the importance of TLS, progress on formally modelling the security of TLS has been slow. A
technicality of TLS prevents it from being proven secure in standard authenticated key exchange (AKE)
models: in AKE, the session key must be indistinguishable from a random key of the same length. However,
the final handshake message of the TLS protocol is encrypted under the session key, so an adversary can
distinguish the session key from a random key by trying to verify the final handshake message. Some
analyses [20, 27] have shown that a truncated form of the TLS handshake is AKE-secure. Others [14] deal
with a substantially weaker security requirement, namely unauthenticated key agreement. Krawczyk [22]
analyzed a variant of the TLS record layer.
Only very recently have analyses of unmodified TLS functionality appeared. Paterson et al. [28] showed
that TLS’s MAC-then-encode-then-encrypt record layer when used with CBC encryption (with certain
length restrictions) satisfies length-hiding authenticated encryption (LHAE). Jager et al. [18] gave the first
full proof of the security of (one ciphersuite of) unmodified TLS in a strong security model. Jager et al.
introduced a variant of the Bellare–Rogaway authenticated key exchange model, called authenticated and
confidential channel establishment (ACCE). They proved that the TLS 1.2 protocol using the TLS DHE DSS
WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA ciphersuite (which we shorten to TLS DHE DSS ) is a secure ACCE protocol, under
standard assumptions on the cryptographic components. Ciphersuites based on RSA key transport and static
Diffie–Hellman have since been shown ACCE-secure by both Kohlar et al. [21] and Krawczyk et al. [24]. (An
alternative modular approach to proving the full security of TLS was given by Brzuska et al. [7].)
But TLS is not just a basic secure channel: it consists of hundreds of variants with many optional complex
functionalities. Alert messages report various error conditions. Previous sessions can be resumed with a
shortened handshake. As of August 2013, over 300 ciphersuites—combinations of cryptographic primitives—
have been standardized. Client authentication is optional, and can be certificate-based or password-based.
Various additional options can be specified via extensions and optional fields. Record layer communication
can be compressed. And most importantly for this paper, after a TLS handshake has been completed and
transmission on the record layer has started, parties can renegotiate the handshake. There have been many
attacks on TLS over the years, such Bleichenbacher’s attack [6] and others involving padding, and Ray and
Dispensa’s renegotiation attack [29], all of which exploit flaws outside the core cryptographic primitives of
TLS.
In this paper, we focus on renegotiation, which allows two parties to either (a) obtain a fresh session key,
(b) change cryptographic parameters, or (c) change authentication credentials. For example, if a client needs
to authenticate using a client certificate but wishes to not reveal her identity over a public channel, she could
first authenticate anonymously (or with pseudonymous credentials), then renegotiate using her real certificate;
since the renegotiation messages are transmitted within the existing record layer, the transmission of her
certificate is encrypted, and thus she obtains privacy for her identity. We will examine TLS renegotiation in
detail, especially in light of previously identified practical attacks related to TLS renegotiation.
Despite the utility of renegotiation in real-world protocols—beyond TLS, renegotiation, rekeying, or
reauthentication is also used in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, Internet Key Exchange version 2, the Tor
anonymity protocol, and others—there has been almost no research in the literature on the security of
protocols involving renegotiation, with the exception of a brief note on the TLS renegotiation attack by
Farrell [12] and the recent thesis of Gelashvili [15], which uses the Scyther tool to automatically identify
the TLS renegotiation attack. Bhargavan et al. [4] implement TLS supporting a variety of ciphersuites and
define an application programming interface for TLS which differentiates between renegotiated phases; using
typechecking, the implementation is shown secure according to a formal specification, albeit with a restricted
adversary who cannot corrupt session keys.
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Figure 1: Ray and Dispensa’s man-in-the-middle renegotiation attack on TLS-reliant applications
1.1 The TLS Renegotiation Issue
All versions of TLS [9, 10, 11], and SSL v3 [13] before it, support optional renegotiation. After the initial
handshake is completed and secure communication begins in the record layer, either party can request
renegotiation. The client can request renegotiation by sending a new ClientHello message in the current
record layer (i.e., encrypted under the current session key); the server can request renegotiation by sending a
HelloRequest message in the record layer, which triggers the client to send a new ClientHello message.
In November 2009, Ray and Dispensa [29] described a man-in-the-middle attack that exploits how certain
TLS-reliant applications—such as HTTP over TLS [30]—process data across renegotiations. The attack is
shown in Figure 1. The attacker Eve observes Alice attempting to establish a TLS session with Bob. Eve
delays Alice’s initial ClientHello and instead establishes her own TLS session with Bob and transmits a
message m0 over that record layer. Then Eve passes Alice’s initial ClientHello to Bob over the Eve–Bob
record layer. Bob views this as a valid renegotiation and responds accordingly; Eve relays the handshake
messages between Alice and Bob, who eventually establish a new record layer to which Eve has no access.
Alice then transmits a message m1 over the Alice–Bob record layer.
This is not strictly speaking an attack on TLS but on how some applications process TLS-protected data.
It results from some applications, including HTTPS [29] and SMTPS [34], concatenating m0 and m1 and
treating them as coming from the same party in the same context. For example, if Eve sends the HTTP
request m0 and Alice sends the HTTP request m1, where
m0 = “GET /orderPizza?deliverTo=123-Fake-St←↩
X-Ignore-This: ”
m1 = “GET /orderPizza?deliverTo=456-Real-St←↩
Cookie: Account=111A2B”
(where ←↩ denotes new-line character), then the concatenated request (across multiple lines for readability) is
m0‖m1 = “GET /orderPizza?deliverTo=123-Fake-St←↩
X-Ignore-This: GET /orderPizza?deliverTo=456-Real-St←↩
Cookie: Account=111A2B”
The “X-Ignore-This:” prefix is an invalid HTTP header, and since this header, without a new line character,
is concatenated with the first line of Alice’s request, so this line is ignored. However, the following line, Alice’s
account cookie, is still processed. Eve is able to have the pizza delivered to herself but paid for by Alice.
It should be noted that Ray and Dispensa’s attack works for both server-only authentication and mutual
authentication modes of TLS: the use of client certificates in general does not prevent the attack [29, 34].
1.2 Countermeasures Added to TLS
The immediate recommendation due to this attack was to disable renegotiation except in cases where it
was essential. Subsequently, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) TLS working group developed
RFC 5746 [31] to provide countermeasures to this attack, with the goal of applicability to SSLv3.0 and TLS
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versions 1.0–1.2. Two countermeasures were standardized: the Signalling Ciphersuite Value (SCSV) and the
Renegotiation Information Extension (RIE). These were adopted by major TLS implementation providers
and web browsers and servers, including Apache, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, and OpenSSL. In RIE,
the parties include the key confirmation value from the previous handshake in a ClientHello/ServerHello
extension [5], demonstrating they have the same view of the previous handshake, or a distinguished null value
if not renegotiation. SCSV is a slight modification that is more compatible with buggy implementations. A
diagram showing the message flow for a generic TLS ciphersuite with SCSV/RIE countermeasures appears in
Figure 5 in Appendix D. According to one survey [33], as of July 2013, 82% of TLS-enabled websites support
SCSV/RIE, with 9% still supporting insecure renegotiation and 9% not supporting renegotiation.
Renegotiation Information Extension (RIE). This countermeasure essentially provides handshake
recognition, confirming that when renegotiating both parties have the same view of the previous handshake.
With this countermeasure, each client or server always includes a renegotiation information extension in
its respective ClientHello or ServerHello message. This extension contains one of three values. If the
party is not renegotiating, then it includes a fixed “empty” string which denotes that the party supports
and understands the renegotiation extension, and the party is in fact not renegotiating. If the party is
renegotiating, then it includes the handshake/key confirmation value from the previous handshake: the
client sends the previous client verify data value while the server sends the concatenation of the previous
client verify data and server verify data values. Intuitively, by including the verify data from the
previous handshake, the parties can be assured that they have the same view of the previous handshake, and
thus the attack in Figure 1 is avoided.
Signalling Ciphersuite Value (SCSV). SCSV was designed to avoid interoperability problems with TLS
1.0 and SSL 3.0 implementations that did not gracefully ignore extension data at the end of ClientHello
and ServerHello messages. With SCSV, the client uses an alternative method in its initial handshake—an
extra, fixed, distinguished ciphersuite value (byte codes 0x00,0xFF) including in its ciphersuite list—to
indicate that it knows how to securely renegotiate. Old servers will ignore this extra value; new servers will
recognize that the client supports secure renegotiation, and the server will use the RIE in the remainder of
the session. In other words, the only difference between SCSV and RIE is in the ClientHello message of
the initial handshake: with RIE, the client sends an empty extension, whereas with SCSV the client sends a
distinguished value in the list of supported ciphersuites.
1.3 Contributions
Security model for renegotiable channel establishment protocols. In Section 2, we present a new
security model for renegotiable protocols. Since our goal is to analyze the security of TLS, we start from
the ACCE model, rather than AKE security models. The primary difference in our model for renegotiable
protocols is that each party’s oracle (session) can have multiple phases; each new phase corresponds to a
renegotiation in that session, and can involve the same or different long-term keys.1 This is qualitatively
different than simply having multiple sessions, since short-term values from one phase of a session may be
used in the renegotiation for the next phase, whereas multiple sessions only share long-term values. Each
oracle maintains state and encryption/MAC keys for each phase. Like in TLS, our formalism allows control
messages to be sent on the encrypted channel. Our extension to the ACCE model also models server-only
authentication in addition to mutual authentication.
The basic goals of a secure renegotiable ACCE protocol are that (a) the adversary should not be able to
read or inject messages on the encrypted channel, and (b) whenever parties successfully renegotiate, they
should have exactly the same view of all previous negotiations and all encrypted messages sent in all previous
phases of that session, even when values from previous phases have been compromised.
Analysis of TLS without and with SCSV/RIE countermeasures. Based on the TLS renegotiation
attack of Ray and Dispensa, we see in Section 3 that TLS without countermeasures is not secure in our
1Note that TLS standards use different words. We say a single session can have multiple phases; the TLS standards refer to
a single connection having multiple sessions.
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model for renegotiation. We subsequently show in Section 4 that, generically, TLS with the SCSV/RIE
countermeasures of RFC 5746 [31] is a weakly secure renegotiable ACCE protocol. In this slightly weaker—but
still quite reasonable—model, the adversary is slightly restricted in the previous secrets she is allowed to
reveal.
Our approach for proving the renegotiable security of TLS with SCSV/RIE countermeasures is modular.
We cannot generically prove that an ACCE-secure TLS ciphersuite is, with SCSV/RIE, a weakly secure
renegotiable ACCE, because the protocol itself is modified by including SCSV/RIE and hence a black-box
approach does not work. Instead, we consider tagged TLS where an arbitrary tag can be provided as an
extension. Via a chain of results and models, we show that if a tagged TLS ciphersuite is secure in an ACCE
variant where Finished messages are revealed, then that TLS ciphersuite with SCSV/RIE is a weakly secure
renegotiable ACCE protocol. This provides a generic justification for the security of SCSV/RIE. Proving
that TLS ciphersuite secure in this tagged variant model seems to be almost no harder than a proof that it is
ACCE-secure; we only needed to change a few lines from the ACCE security proof of TLS DHE DSS [18].
Current formulations of ACCE focus on protocols with forward secrecy. Although ephemeral Diffie–
Hellman TLS ciphersuites are not currently as widely used as RSA key transport-based ciphersuites, they are
growing in use, for example with Google’s 2011 announcement that their default ciphersuite is ephemeral
elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman [25]. We also describe how our approach to renegotiation could be extended if
and when ciphersuites without forward secrecy, such as RSA key transport, are shown ACCE-like-secure.
New countermeasure for TLS. TLS with SCSV/RIE cannot meet our strongest notion of renegotiable
security, only the weaker notion described above. In the strong definition, even if the adversary learns the
session key of one phase, parties who later renegotiate still should detect any earlier message injections by
the adversary. Though the ability to learn session keys of phases while the protocol is still running makes
the adversary quite powerful, this may be realistic in scenarios with long-lived session keys, for example
with session resumption. We present in Section 5 a simple adjustment to the renegotiation information
extension—adding a fingerprint of the transcript of the previous phase’s record layer—so TLS can achieve this
stronger security notion. This countermeasure can be seen as providing record layer recognition, confirming
that both parties have the same view of all communicated messages, rather than just handshake recognition
as in the SCSV/RIE countermeasure.
Table 1 summarizes our results on TLS and renegotiation countermeasures. While our theorems are
specific to TLS, our definitional framework is suitable for any channel establishment protocol that involves
renegotiation, and could for example be used to check if renegotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol
really is secure [26].
On composability and the choice of ACCE. It would be desirable to prove the security of the TLS
renegotiation countermeasures via some kind of composability framework, such as universal composability
or the game-based composability framework of Brzuska et al. [7]. Unfortunately, this is not possible with
existing security definitions for TLS. The TLS renegotiation countermeasures are not achieved by composing
in a black-box manner one protocol or primitive with another. Instead, the SCSV/RIE countermeasure looks
inside the protocol and changes it in a white-box way: it modifies the messages sent by the protocol, and
re-uses an internal value. Thus we cannot make use of existing security results in a black-box compositional
way. Our approach is the “next best thing”: we modify an existing security definition (ACCE) in what seems
to be a minimal way, adding just enough “hooks” to get at the internal values needed to modify and re-use
the required values for the SCSV/RIE countermeasure. We are then able to prove in a fully generic way that
any TLS protocol that satisfies this slightly modified ACCE notion with hooks is, when using the SCSV/RIE
countermeasure, secure against renegotiation attacks. Since the hooks added are quite small, it is not much
work to change a proof that a TLS ciphersuite is ACCE secure to show that it satisfies this slightly modified
ACCE notion as well.
Of the two existing definitional approaches for proving the full security of the TLS protocol [18, 7], we
chose the ACCE approach over the game-based composability approach because renegotiation in TLS makes
extensive use of the interplay between the handshake and record layer.
Moreover, the modifications we make to the execution environment to enable analysis of renegotiable
ACCE protocols can be adapted to capture renegotiation and rekeying in other types of protocols such as
authenticated key exchange.
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2 Security Definitions for Multi-Phase and Renegotiable ACCE
In this section we describe what a multi-phase authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE)
protocol is and our various renegotiation security notions. Essentially, a multi-phase protocol can have many
key exchanges—each called a phase—linked to a single session. Our definition builds on the ACCE definition
of Jager et al. [18], which combined the Bellare–Rogaway model for authenticated key exchange [2] with a
Jager et al.’s stateful variant of Paterson et al.’s length-hiding authenticated encryption [28] , described in
detail in Appendix A.2 .
Notation. If S is a set, x
$← S denotes sampling a value x uniformly at random from S. x $← A(y) denotes
the output x of the probabilistic algorithm A when run on input y and randomly chosen coins. AO(·) means
A is run with access to oracle O(·). The notation [1, n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}; phases[`] denotes the `th
entry in the 1-indexed array phases and |phases| denotes the number of entries in the array. pisA.x denotes
variable x stored in oracle instance pisA.
2.1 Overview
The first security notion, a secure multi-phase ACCE protocol, is a straightforward extension of the ACCE
model to allow multiple, independent phases per session; notably, we require essentially no link between
phases:
• An adversary breaks (multi-phase) authentication if a party accepts in a phase with uncorrupted
long-term keys, but no matching phase exists at the peer.
• An adversary breaks confidentiality/integrity if it can guess the bit b involved in a confidentiality/integrity
experiment similar to stateful length-hiding authenticated encryption.
Our main security definition is a secure renegotiable ACCE protocol, which strengthens the authentication
notion: parties should successfully renegotiate only when they have exact same view of everything that
happened before.
• An adversary breaks renegotiation authentication if a party accepts in a phase where long-term keys
have not been corrupted, but either no matching phase exists at the peer or some previous handshake
or record layer transcript does not match.
However, it is not possible to prove that TLS with the SCSV/RIE countermeasures is a secure renegotiable
ACCE protocol: as we will see in Section 3, the strong definition requires that the views of parties match
when successfully renegotiating, even when previous sessions’ long-term secret keys or session keys were
revealed. TLS’s SCSV/RIE countermeasures do not fully protect against the case when these secret values
are revealed.
As a result, we introduce the weaker, though still quite reasonable, notion of a weakly secure renegotiable
ACCE protocol, and prove in Section 3 that the SCSV/RIE countermeasure for TLS generically provides it:
• An adversary breaks weak renegotiation authentication if a party accepts in a phase with uncorrupted
long-term keys and session keys for each earlier phase were not revealed while that phase was active,
but either no matching phase exists at the peer or some previous handshake or record layer transcript
does not match.
We proceed by describing the execution environment for adversaries interacting with multi-phase ACCE
protocols, then define the various security notions described above.
2.2 Execution Environment
Parties. The environment consists of npa parties, {P1, . . . , Pnpa}. Each party PA is a potential protocol
participant, and has a list of nke long-term key pairs (pkA,1, skA,1), . . . , (pkA,nke , skA,nke). We assume that
each party PA is uniquely identified by any one of its public keys pkA,∗. In practice, there may be other
identities that are bound to these public keys, e.g. by using certificates, but this is out of scope of this paper.
It is common in AKE security models to assume ideal distribution of long-term public keys for simplicity
[2, 8, 18].
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Sessions. Each party PA can participate in up to nse sessions, which are independent executions of the
protocol and can be concurrent or subsequent; all of a party’s sessions have access to the same list of its
long-term key pairs, as well as a trusted list of all parties’ public keys. Each session s ∈ [1, nse] is presented
to the environment as an oracle pisA. Each oracle pi
s
A records in a variable pi
s
A.d the oracle corresponding to
the intended communication partner, e.g.pisA.d = pi
t
B. As well, the variable ρ ∈ {Client,Server} records the
role of the oracle. Parties can play the role of the client in some sessions and of the server in other sessions,
but their role is fixed across all phases within a session.
Phases. Each session can consist of up to nph phases. Each phase consists of two stages: a pre-accept,
or “handshake”, stage, which is effectively an AKE protocol that establishes a session key and performs
mutual or server-only authentication; and a post-accept, or “record layer”, stage, which provides a stateful
communication channel with confidentiality and integrity. A list pisA.phases of different phase states is
maintained; we sometimes use the notation pis,`A for pi
s
A.phases[`]. There can be at most nph phases per oracle.
The last entry of pisA.phases contains the state of the current phase, which may still be in progress. Each
entry pisA.phases[`] in the log contains:
• pk, the public key used by pisA in that phase,
• pk′, the public key that pisA observed as being used for its peer in that phase2,
• ω ∈ {0, 1}, denoting the authentication mode used, where 0 indicates that server-only authentication is
used in that phase and 1 indicates mutual authentication,
• ∆, a counter used to keep track of the current status of the protocol execution,
• α, either accept, reject, or ∅ (for in-progress),
• k, the encryption and/or MAC key(s) established by pisA in that phase,
• T , the transcript of all (plaintext) messages sent and received by pisA during the pre-accept stage of that
phase,
• RTs and RTr, the transcripts of all ciphertexts sent and received (respectively) in the post-accept phase
by pisA encrypted under the key established in that phase,
• b, a random bit sampled by the oracle at the beginning of the phase, and
• st, some additional temporary state (which may, for instance, be used to store ephemeral Diffie–Hellman
exponents for the handshake, or state for the sLHAE scheme for the record layer).
The internal state is initialized to d ← ∅, pk ← ∅, pk′ ← ∅, ω ← ∅, ∆ ← 1, α ← ∅, k ← ∅, T ← ∅,
RT ← ∅, b $← {0, 1}, and st← ∅. When describing a protocol, we will enumerate the protocol messages. The
oracles keep track of the protocol execution by setting the counter state equal to the message number that
the oracles expect to receive next, and update the counter on each message sent (∆ ← ∆ + 1). Once a
phase of a protocol accepts (that is, an encryption key has been negotiated and authentication is believed
to hold), then α is set to accept. If the protocol rejects and the oracle wishes to discontinue operation,
the counter ∆ can be set to the special symbol reject. Whenever a new handshake initialization message
is received, the oracle adds a new entry to its phases list. The variable ω is set at some point during (or
before) the protocol execution, depending on the protocol specification (e.g.in case of TLS, the server can
send the message CertificateRequest to request client, i.e. mutual, authentication, otherwise server-only
authentication is used). Application data messages sent and received encrypted under a newly established
encryption key (e.g. messages sent in the TLS record layer) will be appended to variables RTs and RTr in
the latest entry of the log. If handshake messages for the renegotiation of a new phase are encrypted under
the previous phase’s session key (as they are in TLS), the plaintext messages are appended to variable T in
the new entry of the phase log, and ciphertexts are appended to RT in the previous phase.
Remark 1. The introduction of multiple phases is the main difference compared to previous AKE and
ACCE models. We need to allow multiple authentications and key exchanges within one oracle to capture
the functionality of renegotiation. When limited to a single phase and when each party has only one long-
term key pair, our execution environment/security experiment is equivalent to the original ACCE model of
Jager et al. [18].
2One of the public keys may remain empty, if no client authentication is requested.
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Adversarial interaction. The adversary interacts with oracles by issuing the following queries, which
allow her to control (forward/alter/create/drop) all communication on the public channel (Send), learn
parties’ long-term secret keys (Corrupt), learn session keys (Reveal), and control sending and receiving of
arbitrary messages on the encrypted record layer (Encrypt/Decrypt) using a stateful symmetric encryption
scheme StE (Appendix A.2).
• Send(pisA,m): The adversary can use this query to send any (plaintext) message m of its choosing
to (the current phase of) oracle pisA. The oracle will respond according to the protocol specification,
depending on its internal state. Some distinguished control messages have special behaviour:
– m = (newphase, pk, ω) triggers an oracle to initiate renegotiation of a new phase (or new session if
first phase). Note that the action here may vary based on the role of the party: for example, when
renegotiating in TLS, a client would prepare a new ClientHello message, encrypt it by calling
the Encrypt oracle below, and then return the ciphertext to the adversary for delivery; a server
would correspondingly prepare an encrypted ServerHelloRequest message.
– m = (ready, pk, ω) activates a (server) oracle to use the public key pk in its next phase.
For the above control messages, pk indicates the long-term public key pk the oracle should use in the
phase and ω indicates the authentication mode to use; the oracle returns ⊥ if it does not hold the secret
key for pk. Since the control messages do not specify the identity of the peer, this is instead learned
during the run of the protocol: we are using a post-specified peer model [8]. Delivery of encrypted
messages in the post-accept stage are handled by the Decrypt query below. For protocols such as TLS
that perform renegotiation within the encrypted channel, the oracle may reply with an error symbol ⊥
if it has at least one entry in phases and m 6= (newphase, ·) or (ready, ·).
• Corrupt(PA, pk): Oracle pi1A responds with the long-term secret key skA,i corresponding to public key
pk = pkA,i of party PA, or ⊥ if there is no i such that pk = pkA,i. This is the weak corruption model,
meaning we do not allow the adversary to obtain the party’s internal state nor register rogue keys.
• Reveal(pisA, `): Oracle pisA responds with the key(s) pisA.phases[`].k used in phase `, or ∅ if no such value
exists. Since the TLS record layer is unidirectional, there are both encryption and decryption keys, and
for most ciphersuites also MAC keys, so all 4 keys (KC→Senc ,K
S→C
enc ,K
C→S
mac ,K
S→C
mac ) would be revealed,
though one could refine if desired.
• Encrypt(pisA, ctype,m0,m1, len, hd): This query takes as input a content type ctype, messages m0 and
m1, a length len, and header data hd. Content type control is used for handshake messages. The
adversary cannot query this oracle with ctype = control. Through an abuse of notation, we allow the
party itself to call this oracle with control to encrypt protocol messages that must be sent encrypted;
this abuse of notation allows the party to construct encrypted protocol messages while all aspects of
the security experiment remain synchronized. Content type data is used for record layer messages; in
this case, one of the two messages (chosen based on bit b) is encrypted for the adversary to distinguish.
Encrypt depends on the random bit b sampled by pisA at the beginning of the current phase. It maintains
a counter u initialized to 0 and an encryption state ste, and proceeds as follows:
1. usA ← usA + 1
2. If (ctype = control) and caller is not pisA, then return ⊥
3. (C(0), st
(0)
e )
$← StE.Enc(k, len, hd, ctype‖m0, ste)
4. (C(1), st
(1)
e )
$← StE.Enc(k, len, hd, ctype‖m1, ste)
5. If (C(0) = ⊥) or (C(1) = ⊥), then return ⊥
6. (CsA[u
s
A], ste)← (C(b
A
s ), st
(bsA)
e )
7. Return CsA[u
s
A]
• Decrypt(pisA, C, hd): This query takes as input a ciphertext C and header data hd. If pisA has not
accepted in the current phase, then it returns ⊥. Decrypt maintains a counter v and a switch diverge,
both initialized to 0, and a decryption state std, and proceeds as described below. If the decryption
of C contains a control message, then the oracle processes the message according to the protocol
specification, which may include updating the state of the oracle and/or creating a new phase, and
returns any protocol response message to the adversary, which may or may not be encrypted by calling
Encrypt according to the protocol specification. Technically it proceeds as follows:
1. (B, t)← pisA.d, vsA ← vsA + 1, m′ ← ∅
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2. (ctype‖m, std) = StE.Dec(k, hd, C, std)
3. If (vsA > u
t
B) or (C 6= CtB [vsA]), then diverge← 1
4. If (bsA = 1) and (diverge = 1), then m
′ ← m
5. If ctype = control, then r′ ← protocol response for m
6. Else r′ ← ⊥
7. Return (m′, r′)
Remark 2. Note that k may be a ‘multi-part’ key with different parts for encryption, decryption, and MAC;
we assume StE.Enc and StE.Dec know which parts to use. Also note that the ‘protocol response for m′ may be
encrypted by the party internally making an Encrypt call.
The behaviour of the Decrypt oracle in this combined definition for confidentiality and integrity can be
somewhat difficult to understand. It extends that of stateful length-hiding authenticated encryption , for
which we give the definition and an explanation in Appendix A.2.
Let us review how an adversary would use the oracles to carry out a normal TLS negotiation and
renegotiation. First the adversary uses the Send query to deliver newphase and ready messages to the
client and server. The client responds to the Send query with a ClientHello message; the server responds
with ⊥. The adversary delivers the first message from the client to the server by calling the server’s Send
oracle, which returns the next message from the server to the client (ServerHello, ServerKeyExchange,
etc.). The adversary delivers these to the client via a Send query. The client responds with several plain
text messages (such as ClientKeyExchange) as well as a ChangeCipherSpec message. There is one more
message, the client’s Finished message, which the client first encrypts using an internal Encrypt call. The
plaintext messages are delivered by the adversary to the server using Send and the encrypted message is
delivered using Decrypt. The response by the server from Send will be a ChangeCipherSpec message and
the response by the server from Decrypt will the server’s Finished message, which the server first encrypts
using an internal Encrypt oracle call. The encrypted message is delivered by the adversary using Decrypt.
The parties set α = accept and are now ready to use the record layer, which the adversary can make use of
by matching Encrypt/Decrypt queries. When the adversary wants to trigger client-initiated renegotiation,
it sends a newphase message via a Send query to the client, who responds with a ClientHello message
encrypted via an internal Encrypt call. The adversary delivers this to the server by a Decrypt call; the server
responds with an encrypted protocol message, and so on. Note that the plaintext handshake messages are
appended to the new phase’s transcript T and the ciphertext handshake messages are also appended to the
current existing phase’s transcript RT . When the parties accept in the phase, they begin using the encryption
keys for the new phase.
2.3 Security Definitions
In the original security definition for ACCE protocols, security is defined by requiring that (i) the protocol is
a secure authentication protocol, thus any party pisA reaches the post-accept state only if there exists another
party pitB such that pi
s
A has a matching conversation (in the sense of [18] , reproduced in Appendix A.1 ) to
pitB , and (ii) data transmitted in the post-accept stage over a secure channel is secure (in a sense similar to
sLHAE).
We extend this notion to include security when a session has multiple phases that can be renegotiated. We
will give several security definitions with different levels of security against renegotiation attacks, as described
in the introduction to Section 2.
Each security notion is formally defined as a game played between an adversary A and a challenger C,
with the same overall setup but different winning conditions. In each game, the challenger implements the
collection of oracles {pisA : A ∈ [1, npa], s ∈ [1, nse]}. At the beginning of the game, the challenger generates
nke long-term key pairs (pkA,1, skA,1), . . . , (pkA,nke , skA,nke) for each party PA; we assume that, within a
party, all public key pairs are distinct. (That distinct parties have distinct key pairs comes as a consequence
of the protocol being secure.) The adversary receives all parties’ public keys as input. The adversary may
issue Send, Corrupt, Reveal, Encrypt, and Decrypt queries to the oracles and eventually terminates.
Table 1 at the end of the section provides a comparative summary of the various security notions introduced
in this section, as well as a summary of the results on TLS that appear in the rest of this paper.
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Definition 1 (Correct multi-phase ACCE). We say Π is a correct multi-phase ACCE protocol if, for
all oracles pisA with destination address pi
s
A.d = pi
t
B, and for all `, `
′ ∈ [1, nph] for which pisA.phases[`].T
and pitB .phases[`
′].T are matching conversations, it holds that pisA.phases[`].α = pi
t
B .phases[`
′].α = accept,
pisA.phases[`].ω = pi
t
B .phases[`].ω and pi
s
A.phases[`].k = pi
t
B .phases[`
′].k.
2.3.1 Confidentiality.
All of our notions for secure ACCE protocols will require confidentiality/integrity of the post-accept stage
record layer in each uncorrupted phase. Intuitively, an adversary should not be able to guess the bit b used
in the Encrypt/Decrypt oracles in a phase where she has not impersonated the parties (i.e., corrupted the
long-term secret keys before the phase accepted) or revealed the session key of the party or its peer. As with
the ACCE notion of Jager et al. [18], this notion ensures forward security: corrupting long-term secret keys
after completion of a session should not impact confidentiality/integrity of messages. (We discuss how these
definitions could be extended to the non-forward-secure case in Appendix B.)
Definition 2 (Confidentiality/integrity). Suppose an algorithm A with running time τ interacts with a
multi-phase ACCE protocol Π in the above execution environment and returns a tuple (A, s, `, b′). If
C1. pisA.phases[`].α = accept; and
C2. A did not query Corrupt(PA, pisA.phases[`].pk) before pisA accepted in phase `; and
C3. A did not query Corrupt(PB , pisA.phases[`].pk′) before pisA accepted in phase `, where pisA.d = pitB; and
C4. A did not query Reveal(pisA, `); and
C5. A did not query Reveal(pitB , `′), where pitB = pisA.d is pisA’s intended communication partner, and `′ is any
phase for which pitB .phases[`
′].T is a matching conversation to pisA.phases[`].T ; and
C6. |Pr [pisA.phases[`].b = b′]− 1/2| ≥ ,
then we say A (τ, )-breaks confidentiality/integrity of Π.
2.3.2 Secure multi-phase ACCE.
First we state a straightforward extension of the ACCE model to protocols with multiple phases, but with
essentially no security condition relating one phase to another. This definition captures the properties of
TLS without any renegotiation countermeasures, and will be used as a stepping stone in our generic result in
Section 4. For this simplest notion of authentication, an adversary should not be able to cause a phase to
accept unless there exists a phase at the peer with a matching pre-accept handshake transcript, provided she
has not impersonated the parties (i.e., corrupted long-term secret keys before the phase accepted).
Definition 3 (Secure multi-phase ACCE). Suppose an algorithm A with running time τ interacts with a
multi-phase ACCE protocol Π in the above execution environment and terminates. If, with probability at least
, there exists an oracle pisA with pi
s
A.d = pi
t
B and a phase ` such that
A1. pisA.phases[`].α = accept; and
A2. A did not query Corrupt(PA, pisA.phases[`].pk) before pisA accepted in phase `; and
A3. A did not query Corrupt(PB , pisA.phases[`].pk′) before pisA accepted in phase `; and
A4. if pisA.phases[`].ω = 0 then pi
s
A.ρ = Client; and
A5. A did not query Reveal(pitB , `′) before pisA accepted in phase ` for any `′ such that pitB .phases[`′].T is a
matching conversation to pisA.phases[`].T ; and
M. there is no `′ such that pitB .phases[`
′].T is a matching conversation to pisA.phases[`].T
then we say that A (τ, )-breaks authentication of Π.
A protocol Π is a (τ, )-secure multi-phase ACCE protocol if there exists no algorithm A that (τ, )-breaks
confidentiality/integrity (Def. 2) or authentication (as above) of Π.
In A1 and M we redefine the NoMatch-condition from [2]. In A2 we exclude leaking of the secret long-term
keys of the accepting party (necessary for example to counter key compromise impersonation attacks [23]).
In A3 we exclude corruptions of the peer. In A4 (only for server-only authentication), we ensure that the
adversary only wins by making a client-oracle maliciously accept. In A5 we exclude trivial attacks that exist
for protocols with explicit key confirmation and probabilistic computations under the negotiated key.
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The secure multi-phase ACCE definition when limited to a phase per session and a single key pair per
party (nph = nke = 1) collapses to an extension of the original ACCE definition, the extension being support
for server-only authentication.
2.3.3 Secure renegotiable ACCE.
We next strengthen the authentication notion to include renegotiation. Intuitively, an adversary should
not be able to cause a phase to accept unless there exists a phase at the peer with a matching pre-accept
handshake transcript and all previous phases’ handshake and record layer transcripts match, provided she has
not impersonated the parties in the current phase. We will show in Section 5 that TLS with our proposed
countermeasure satisfies this definition.
Definition 4 (Secure renegotiable ACCE). Suppose an algorithm A with running time τ interacts with a
multi-phase ACCE protocol Π in the above execution environment and terminates. If, with probability at least
, there exists an oracle pisA with pi
s
A.d = pi
t
B and a phase `
∗ such that
A1–A5 as in Definition 3 with `∗, and either
M′(a) pitB .phases[`
∗].T is not a matching conversation to pisA.phases[`
∗].T or
M′(b) for some ` < `∗, pisA.phases[`].T‖RTs‖RTr 6= pitB .phases[`].T‖RTr‖RTs;
we say A (τ, )-breaks renegotiation authentication of Π.
A protocol Π is a (τ, )-secure renegotiable ACCE protocol if there exists no algorithm A that (τ, )-breaks
confidentiality/integrity (Def. 2) or renegotiation authentication (as defined above) of Π.
2.3.4 Weakly secure renegotiable ACCE.
Unfortunately, TLS with SCSV/RIE does not meet Def. 4 because, as we will see in Section 4.1, revealing
session keys in earlier phases allows the adversary to change the messages on the record layer in earlier phases,
but SCSV/RIE will not detect this.
Of course, revealing earlier phases’ session keys while that phase is active and still expecting detection
when renegotiating later is a strong security property, and the lack of this property does not imply an attack
in most scenarios. Our desire to characterize the renegotiable security of the SCSV/RIE countermeasure
motivates a slightly weaker renegotiation notion: when previous phases’ session keys are not revealed while
that phase is active and the current phase’s long-term secret keys are not corrupted, no adversary should be
able to cause a phase to accept unless there exists a phase at the peer with a matching pre-accept handshake
transcript and all previous phases’ handshake and record layer transcripts match.
Definition 5 (Weakly secure renegotiable ACCE). Suppose an algorithm A with running time τ interacts
with a multi-phase ACCE protocol Π in the above execution environment and terminates. If, with probability
at least , there exists an oracle pisA with pi
s
A.d = pi
t
B and a phase `
∗ such that all conditions from Def. 4, as
well as the following additional conditions are satisfied:
A6. A did not issue a Reveal(pisA, `) query before pisA accepted in phase `+ 1, for every ` < `∗, and
A7. A did not issue a Reveal(pitB , `) query before pisA accepted in phase `+ 1, for every ` < `∗;
then we say that A (τ, )-breaks weak renegotiation authentication of Π.
A protocol Π is a (τ, )-weakly secure renegotiable ACCE protocol if there exists no algorithm A that
(τ, ) breaks confidentiality/integrity (Def. 2) or weak renegotiation authentication (as defined above) of Π.
Remark 3. While conditions A6 and A7 prohibit the adversary from revealing encryption keys of previous
phases while active for the purposes of breaking authentication, the confidentiality/integrity aspect of Def. 5
still places no such restriction on previous encryption keys being revealed.
Remark 4. The chain of implications between Defns. 3–5 is as follows: secure renegotiable ACCE protocol
(Defn. 4) =⇒ weakly secure renegotiable ACCE (Defn. 5) =⇒ secure multi-phase ACCE (Defn. 3) =⇒
ACCE protocol [18]. The separations are strict, as seen in Table 1.
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Secure
multi-phase
ACCE
Weakly secure
renegotiable
ACCE
Secure
renegotiable
ACCE
(Defn. 3) (Defn. 5) (Defn. 4)
Secure against Ray–Dispensa-type attack × X with queryrestrictions A6,A7 X
Authentication
A2. Corrupt pk before acceptance not allowed not allowed not allowed
A3. Corrupt peer’s pk before acceptance not allowed not allowed not allowed
A5. Reveal session keys during active handshake not allowed not allowed not allowed
A6. Reveal session keys of previous phases allowed not allowed allowed
A7. Reveal session keys of previous phases allowed not allowed allowed
M. every phase that accepts has a matching handshake
transcript at some phase of the peer implied
M′(a) every phase that accepts has a matching
handshake transcript at the same phase of the peer implied implied
M′(a) when a phase accepts, handshake and record layer
transcripts in all previous phases equal those at the peer implied implied
Confidentiality/integrity (Defn. 2) implied implied implied
TLS ∗ without countermeasures — × (Sect. 3) × (Sect. 3)
Tagged-ACCE-fin-secure TLS ∗ with SCSV/RIE
countermeasure
— X(Thm. 1) —
TLS RSA with SCSV/RIE countermeasure ?1 × (App. B.2) / ?1 × (Sect. 4.1)
TLS DHE DSS with SCSV/RIE countermeasure X (Cor. 2) X (Cor. 2) × (Sect. 4.1)
Secure multi-phase TLS ∗ with new (Sect. 5)
countermeasure
— — X(Thm. 4)
TLS RSA with new (Sect. 5) countermeasure ?1 × (App. B.2) / ?1 × (App. B.2) / ?1
TLS DHE DSS with new (Sect. 5) countermeasure X (Thm. 4) X (Thm. 4) X (Thm. 4)
Table 1: Summary of security notions and results on TLS
1 TLS RSA key transport ciphersuites may be able to be shown secure under notions with suitable restrictions
on forward security; see discussion in Appendix B.
3 Renegotiation (In)security of TLS
We now discuss how the original TLS protocol, without SCSV/RIE countermeasures, fits into our model, and
show how the attack of Ray and Dispensa is captured in the model.
Jager et al. [18] in their full version [19, Fig. 3] described how to map TLS into the ACCE model. We
highlight a few components of that mapping, and the alterations needed for renegotiation.
Oracles generally respond to Send, Encrypt, and Decrypt queries as specified by the TLS handshake and
record layer protocols. The Send control message m = (newphase, pk) when sent to a client causes the client
to send a new ClientHello message, and when sent to a server causes the server to send a new HelloRequest
message. For the Encrypt and Decrypt queries, we use a content type field ctype that corresponds to the
ContentType field of the TLSPlaintext data type in the TLS record layer specification [11, §6.2.1]:
Packets with ContentType=change cipher spec (20) or handshake (22) are considered in our model
to have ctype = control and packets with ContentType=application data (23) are considered in our
model to have ctype = data. We do not explicitly handle ContentType=alert (21) messages. The Reveal
query reveals the encryption and MAC keys derived from the master secret key, not the master secret key
itself.
3.1 TLS without countermeasures is not a (weakly) secure renegotiable ACCE
Recall the TLS renegotiation attack by Ray and Dispensa [29], as described previously in Figure 1 on
page 4. The attacker Eve observes Alice attempting to establish a TLS session with Bob. Eve delays Alice’s
initial ClientHello and instead establishes her own TLS session with Bob and transmits a message m0 over
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that record layer. Then Eve passes Alice’s initial ClientHello to Bob over the Eve–Bob record layer. Bob
views this as a valid renegotiation and responds accordingly; Eve relays the handshake messages between
Alice and Bob, who will eventually establish a new record layer to which Eve has no access. Alice then
transmits a message m1 over the Alice–Bob record layer. Intuitively, this is a valid attack: Alice believes this
is the initial handshake, but Bob believes this is a renegotiated handshake.
Formally, this attack is captured in our weakly secure renegotiable ACCE model of Definition 5 as follows.
Assume Alice and Bob each have a single oracle instance, and Eve has carried out the above attack. Then
for Bob’s oracle pi1Bob, the value of `
∗ is 2: the last entry in phases where Bob has a matching handshake
transcript to some handshake transcript in Alice’s oracle pi1Alice is the second (and last) phases entry. The
attacker has broken renegotiation authentication at both Alice and Bob’s instances. At Alice by satisfying
condition M′(a) (Alice’s first handshake transcript does not match Bob’s first handshake transcript), and at
Bob by satisfying both M′(a) (Bob’s second handshake transcript does not match Alice’s second handshake
transcript) and M′(b) (for every ` < 2, Bob’s `th handshakes/record layer transcripts do not match Alice’s).
Thus TLS without countermeasures is not a weakly secure or secure renegotiable ACCE.
4 Renegotiation Security of TLS with SCSV/RIE Countermea-
sures
In this section we analyze the security of TLS with the SCSV/RIE countermeasures proposed in RFC 5746 [31].
We first see, in Section 4.1, that the SCSV/RIE countermeasures are not enough to prove that TLS satisfies
our strongest notion, a secure renegotiable ACCE (Defn. 4).
Our goal will be to show that TLS with the SCSV/RIE countermeasures is a weakly secure renegotiable
ACCE. Ideally, we would do so generically, with a result saying something like “If a TLS ciphersuite is a
secure ACCE, then that TLS ciphersuite with SCSV/RIE is a weakly secure renegotiable ACCE.” As noted
in the introduction, we do so generically since the protocol is modified to include the countermeasure values
in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages, and thus we cannot make use of the ACCE security of the
particular TLS ciphersuite in a black-box way. Moreover, we must ensure that revealing the Finished values
from the previous handshake does not impact its security. Although these barriers prevent a generic black-box
result, a white-box examination of the proof details of TLS DHE DSS [18] finds that only small changes are
needed in the proof.
We will provide a sequence of definitions and results that justifies the security of the SCSV/RIE
countermeasure. Figure 2 summarizes our approach.
1. Define a modified ACCE security model, called tagged-ACCE-fin, specific to TLS, in which the adversary
can reveal Finished messages after the handshake completes and supply tags to be used in extensions.
2. Define tagged TLS as a modification of a standard ciphersuite in which arbitrary opaque data can be
placed in an extension field in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages.
3. Explain how the existing proof of that TLS DHE DSS is ACCE secure can be modified in a very minor
way to show that tagged TLS DHE DSS is tagged-ACCE-fin-secure. For completeness, we give a full
proof of this fact in the appendix.
4. Show that, if a TLS ciphersuite is tagged-ACCE-fin secure, then that TLS ciphersuite with SCSV/RIE
is a secure multi-phase ACCE.
5. Show that, if a TLS ciphersuite with SCSV/RIE is a secure multi-phase ACCE, then it is also a weakly
secure renegotiable ACCE.
Combined, these results yield (a) a general result justifying the security of the SCSV/RIE countermeasure,
and (b) that TLS DHE DSS with SCSV/RIE countermeasures is a weakly secure renegotiable ACCE.
4.1 TLS with SCSV/RIE is not a secure renegotiable ACCE
Definition 4 requires that, even when the adversary can reveal previous phases’ session keys, the parties will
not successfully renegotiate if the attacker has manipulated the record layer. The SCSV/RIE countermeasures
do not protect against this type of adversary. They only provide assurance that handshake transcripts from
previous phases match exactly. TLS itself of course provides integrity protection for record layer transcripts
via the message authentication codes, but Definition 4 allows the adversary to reveal the encryption and
MAC keys of previous phases. Thus, an adversary who reveals the current encryption and MAC keys can
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Figure 2: Summary of results on TLS and renegotiation
modify record layer messages but Alice and Bob will still successfully renegotiate a new phase (although the
adversary must not alter the number of messages sent, as the number of record layer messages sent in the
previous phase happens to be protected by SCSV and RIE countermeasures).
We emphasize that while this demonstrates a theoretical weakness in TLS renegotiation countermeasures
compared to our very strong security model, it does not translate into an attack on TLS renegotiation
countermeasures when intermediate phases’ encryption and MAC keys are not revealed. SCSV/RIE meets its
original goal of authenticating the previous handshake.
4.2 Tagged-ACCE model and tagged TLS
In this section we introduce a variant of the ACCE model from which we can prove a generic result on the
renegotiable security of TLS with countermeasures. In our models, the tag can be an arbitrary string. For our
purpose of analyzing TLS with SCSV/RIE countermeasures, the tag will be the previous phase’s Finished
messages.
4.2.1 Tagged-ACCE security model
The tagged-ACCE security model is an extension of the ACCE security model to allow arbitrary tags as
follows. Since the original ACCE definition of Jager et al. [18] does not support server-only authentication,
while our definition allows both authentication modes, we extend the ACCE definition implied by limiting
multi-phase ACCE (Definition 3) to a single phase (nph = 1) and at most one public key per party (nke = 1).
The phases log phases is extended with an additional per-phase variable tag.
• Send(pisA,m). The adversary can specify an arbitrary tag during session initialization.
– If m = (newphase, ω, tag), the party sets its internal variable ρ← Client, sets authentication mode
ω, stores tag, and responds with the first protocol message.
– If m = (ready, ω, tag), the party sets ρ← Server, authentication mode ω, stores tag, and responds
with the next protocol message, if any.
The freshness and winning conditions of tagged-ACCE are unchanged from ACCE.
4.2.2 Tagged-ACCE-fin security model
We will work with a further variant, tagged-ACCE-fin, which is not a fully general security model but instead
is tied specifically to generic TLS protocols of the form given in Figure 5. It adds the following query:
• RevealFin(pisA): If α = accept, then return the finC and finS values sent/received by the queried
oracle. Return ∅ otherwise.
The following queries are modified:
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• Encrypt(pisA, ctype,m0,m1, len, hd): The adversary is not prevented from querying with ctype =
control.
• Decrypt(pisA, C, hd): No semantic meaning is associated with ctype = control messages. In other words,
line 5 of Decrypt is removed.
We extend the Encrypt- and Decrypt-queries to allow the adversary to send and receive messages on the
encrypted channel with content type control. The freshness and winning conditions of tagged-ACCE-fin are
as in ACCE.
Remark 5. Revealing the Finished messages is very specific to the TLS protocol family and is not necessarily
relevant for other protocols. Imagine, for example, a variant of the SCSV/RIE countermeasure where a
separate hash of the complete transcript as it was sent over the channel is used as an authenticator. Since
this value can be computed by any passive adversary, leaking this value could not affect security.
4.2.3 Tagged TLS
Figure 5 shows a generic TLS ciphersuite, along with the SCSV/RIE extensions denoted in green with a
dagger. By tagged TLS, we mean the generic TLS ciphersuite from Figure 5, without any of the SCSV/RIE
extensions shown in green, but where an arbitrary string can be placed in the extC and extS fields. In other
words, it is a normal TLS ciphersuite, but with an arbitrary extension field that just carries strings that are
not being interpreted as having any particular meaning.
As noted in the beginning of this section, we cannot generically prove that, if a TLS ciphersuite is
ACCE-secure, then the tagged version of that ciphersuite is tagged-ACCE- or tagged-ACCE-fin-secure, as
we have made white-box modifications to the TLS protocol in introducing the SCSV/RIE countermeasure.
Thus we cannot use its security results in a black-box manner. However, in most cases, a white-box approach,
where the actual security proof is modified or extended, should be possible, and even very easy. This was
indeed the case when we examined tagged TLS DHE DSS .
For completeness, we will show that TLS DHE DSS is a secure tagged-ACCE-fin protocol. The proof follows
almost exactly the proof by Jager et al. [18] that TLS DHE DSS is a secure ACCE protocol. The intuition
that leaking the Finished messages does not affect security is as follows. The ACCE proof of TLS DHE DSS
exploits the fact that the pseudo-random function is keyed with a value chosen uniformly at random; the
proof then replaces the application keys and Finished messages with uniformly random values, which are
then completely independent of any information exchanged during the handshake. We can use the same
technique to show that no adversary having access to the plaintext Finished messages can break the security
of the sLHAE scheme used in the record layer. Including arbitrary extra data in the handshake messages
does not impact security.
Theorem 1 (Tagged TLS DHE DSS is a secure tagged-ACCE-fin). Let µ be the output length of PRF and let
λ be the length of the nonces rC and rS. Assume that the pseudo-random function PRF is (τ, prf)-secure, the
signature scheme is (τ, sig)-secure, the DDH-problem is (τ, ddh)-hard in the group G used to compute the TLS
premaster secret, the hash function is (τ, H)-collision resistant, and the PRFODH-problem is (τ, prfodh)-hard
with respect to G and PRF. Suppose that the stateful symmetric encryption scheme is (τ, sLHAE)-secure.
For any adversary that (τ ′, tls)-breaks the tagged TLS DHE DSS in the sense of Definition 3 in the tACCE
execution environment with τ ≈ τ ′ it holds that
tls ≤ (npanse)
2
2λ−2
+ npanse ·
(
4npasig + 3ddh + (npanse + 2)
(
PRFODH + prf + H +
1
2µ
+ sLHAE
))
Recall that npa and nse are the maximum number of parties and sessions per party; in tagged-ACCE-fin, the
number of phases nph and number of keypairs nke are both at most 1.
To prove Theorem 1, we closely follow the approach of Jager et al. [19] and divide the set of all adversaries
into two categories:
1. Adversaries that succeed in making an oracle accept maliciously. We call such an adversary an
authentication-adversary.
2. Adversaries that do not succeed in making any oracle accept maliciously, but which answer the
encryption/integrity challenge. We call such an adversary an encryption-adversary.
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Note that our proof proceeds exactly as the proof of Jager et al. to enable comparison, thus we also prove
Theorem 1 by two lemmas. Lemma 1 bounds the probability auth that an authentication-adversary succeeds,
Lemma 2 bounds the probability enc that an encryption-adversary succeeds. Then we have
tls ≤ auth + enc .
Lemma 1. For any adversary running in time τ ′ ≈ τ , the probability that there exists an oracle pisi that
accepts maliciously is at most
auth ≤ (npanse)
2
2λ−1
+ npanse ·
(
2npasig + ddh + (npanse + 2)
(
PRFODH + prf + H +
1
2µ
+ sLHAE
))
where all quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 1.
Note that auth ≤ client + server, where client is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an
oracle with ρ = Client that accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 3, and server is an upper bound on
the probability that there exists an oracle with ρ = Server that accepts maliciously. Also note that as Server
is an upper bound, this implicitly covers the case of performing server-only authentication in all phases (and
by definition no server oracle can then accept maliciously, resulting in Server = 0).
We claim that
client ≤ (npanse)
2
2λ
+ npanse ·
(
npasig + npanse
(
PRFODH + prf + H +
1
2µ
+ sLHAE
))
server ≤ (npanse)
2
2λ
+ npanse ·
(
npasig + ddh + 2prf + H +
1
2µ
+ sLHAE
)
and thus
auth ≤ client + server
≤ (npanse)
2
2λ−1
+ npanse ·
(
2npasig + ddh + (npanse + 2)
(
PRFODH + prf + H +
1
2µ
+ sLHAE
))
.
4.2.4 Proof of Lemma 1: client
Proof. We first show, that the probability that there exists an oracle with ρ = Client that accepts maliciously
in the sense of Definition 3 is negligible. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games, following [3, 32]. The first
game is the real security experiment. We then describe several intermediate games that modify the original
game step-by-step, and argue that our complexity assumptions imply that each game is computationally
indistinguishable from the previous one. We end up in the final game, where no adversary can break the
security of the protocol.
Let break
(1)
δ be the event that occurs when the first oracle that accepts maliciously in the sense of
Definition 3 with ρ = Client in Game δ.
Game 0. This game equals the multi-phase ACCE security experiment used in Section 2.2. Thus, for some
client we have
Pr[break
(1)
0 ] = client .
Game 1. In this game we add an abort rule. The challenger aborts if there exists any oracle pisi that
chooses a random nonce rC or rS which is not unique. More precisely, the game is aborted if the adversary
ever makes a first Send query to an oracle pisi , and the oracle replies with random nonce rC or rS such that
there exists some other oracle pis
′
i′ which has previously sampled the same nonce.
In total less than npanse nonces rC and rS are sampled, each uniformly random from {0, 1}λ. Thus, the
probability that a collision occurs is bounded by (npanse)
2 · 2−λ, which implies
Pr[break
(2)
0 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)1 ] +
(npanse)
2
2λ
.
Note that now each oracle has a unique nonce rC or rS , which is included in the signatures. We will use this
to ensure that each oracle that accepts with non-corrupted partner has a unique partner oracle.
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Game 2. We try to guess which client oracle will be the first oracle to accept maliciously and the phase in
which this happens. If our guess is wrong, i.e., if there is another (Client or Server) oracle that accepts before
or if they accept in a different phase, then we abort the game.
Technically, this game is identical, except for the following. The challenger guesses two random indices
(i∗, s∗) $← [npa]× [nse]. If there exists an oracle pisi that accepts maliciously, and (i, s) 6= (i∗, s∗) and pisi has
ρ 6= Client, then the challenger aborts the game. Note that if the first oracle pisi that accepts maliciously has
ρ = Client, then with probability 1/(npa · nse) we have (i, s) = (i∗, s∗), and thus
Pr[break
(2)
1 ] = npanse · Pr[break(2)2 ] .
Note that in this game the attacker can only break the security of the protocol if oracle pis
∗
i∗ is the first oracle
that accepts maliciously and has ρ = Client; otherwise the game is aborted.
Game 3. Again the challenger proceeds as before, but we add an abort rule. We want to make sure that
pis
∗
i∗ receives as input exactly the Diffie–Hellman value TS that was selected by some other uncorrupted oracle
that received the nonce rC chosen by pi
s∗
i∗ as first input (note that there may be several such oracles, since
the attacker may send copies of rC to many oracles).
Technically, we abort and raise event abortsig, if oracle pi
s∗
i∗ ever receives as input a message m3 = certS
indicating intended partner Π = j and message m4 = (p, g, TS , σS) such that σS is a valid signature over
rC‖rS‖p‖g‖TS , but there exists no oracle pitj which has previously output σS . Clearly we have
Pr[break
(1)
2 ] ≤ Pr[break(1)3 ] + Pr[abortsig] .
Note that the experiment is aborted, if pis
∗
i∗ does not accept maliciously, due to Game 2. This means that
party Pj must not be corrupted when pi
s∗
i∗ accepts (as otherwise pi
s∗
i∗ does not accept maliciously). To show
that Pr[abortsig] ≤ npa · sig, we construct a signature forger as follows. The forger receives as input a public
key pk∗ and simulates the challenger for A. It guesses index φ $← [npa], sets pkφ = pk∗, and generates all
long-term public/secret keys as before. Then it proceeds as the challenger in Game 3, except that it uses its
chosen-message oracle to generate a signature under pkφ when necessary.
If φ = j and the corresponding public key is pkj , which happens with probability 1/(npa), then the forger
can use the signature received by pis
∗
i∗ to break the EUF-CMA security of the signature scheme with success
probability sig. Therefore we gain that Pr[abortsig]/(npa) ≤ sig; if Pr[abortsig] is not negligible, then sig is
not negligible as well and we have
Pr[break
(1)
2 ] ≤ Pr[break(1)3 ] + npasig .
Note that in Game 3 oracle pis
∗
i∗ receives as input a Diffie–Hellman value TS such that TS was chosen by
another oracle, but not by the attacker. Note also that there may be multiple oracles that issued a signature
σS containing rC , since the attacker may have sent several copies of rC to several oracles.
Game 4. In this game we want to make sure that we know the oracle pitj which will issue the signature
σS that pi
s∗
i∗ receives. Note that this signature includes the random nonce rS , which is unique due to
Game 1. Therefore the challanger in this game proceeds as before, but additionally guesses two indices
(j∗, t∗) $← [npa]× [nse]. It aborts, if the attacker does not make a Send-query containing rC to pit∗j∗ and pit
∗
j∗
responds in this phase with messages containing σS such that σS is forwarded to pi
s∗
i∗ .
We know that there must exist at least one oracle that outputs σS in some phase such that σS is forwarded
to pis
∗
i∗ , due to Game 3. Thus we have
Pr[break
(1)
3 ] ≤ npanse Pr[break(1)4 ] .
Note that in this game we know exactly that oracle pit
∗
j∗ chooses the Diffie–Hellman share TS that pi
s∗
i∗ uses to
compute its premaster secret.
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Game 5. Recall that pis
∗
i∗ computes the master secret as ms = PRF(T
tc
S , label1‖rC‖rS), where TS denotes
the Diffie–Hellman share received from pit
∗
j∗ , and tc denotes the Diffie–Hellman exponent chosen by pi
s∗
i∗ . In this
game we replace the master secret ms computed by pis
∗
i∗ with an independent random value m˜s. Moreover, if
pit
∗
j∗ receives as input the same Diffie–Hellman share TC that was sent from pi
s∗
i∗ , then we set the master secret
of pit
∗
j∗ equal to m˜s. Otherwise we compute the master secret as specified in the protocol. We claim that
Pr[break
(1)
4 ] ≤ Pr[break(1)5 ] + PRFODH .
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes Game 5 from Game 4. We show that this implies an
adversary B that solves the PRFODH problem.
Adversary B outputs (label1‖rC‖rS) to its oracle and receives in response (g, gu, gv, R), where either
R = PRF(guv, label1‖rC‖rS) or R $← {0, 1}µ. It runs A by implementing the challenger for A, and embeds
(gu, gv) as follows. Instead of letting pis
∗
i∗ choose TC = g
tC for random tC
$← Zq, B defines TC := gu. Similarly,
the Diffie–Hellman share TS of pi
t∗
j∗ is defined as TS := g
v. Finally, the master secret of pis
∗
i∗ is set equal to R.
Note that pis
∗
i∗ computes the master secret after receiving TS from pi
t∗
j∗ , and then it sends m8 = TC . If
the attacker decides to forward m8 to pi
t∗
j∗ , then the master secret of pi
t∗
j∗ is set equal to R. If pi
t∗
j∗ receives
TC′ 6= TC , then B queries its oracle to compute ms′ = PRF(T vC′ , label1‖rC‖rS), and sets the master secret of
pit
∗
j∗ equal to ms
′.
Note that in any case algorithm B knows the master secret of pis∗i∗ and pit
∗
j∗ , and thus is able to compute
all further protocol messages (in particular the finished messages finC and finS) and answer a potential
Reveal-query to pit
∗
j∗ as required (note that there is no Reveal-query to pi
s∗
i∗ , as otherwise the experiment is
aborted, due to Game 2). If R = PRF(guv, label1‖rC‖rS), then the view of A is identical to Game 4, while if
R
$← {0, 1}µ then it is identical to Game 5, which yields the above claim.
Game 6. In this game we replace the function PRF(m˜s, ·) used by pis∗i∗ with a random function F . If pit
∗
j∗
uses the same master secret m˜s as pis
∗
i∗ (cf. Game 5), then the function PRF(m˜s, ·) used by pit
∗
j∗ is replaced as
well. Of course the same random function is used for both oracles sharing the same m˜s. In particular, this
function is used to compute the Finished messages by both partner oracles.
Distinguishing Game 6 from Game 5 implies an algorithm breaking the security of the pseudorandom
function PRF, thus
Pr[break
(1)
5 ] ≤ Pr[break(1)6 ] + prf .
Game 7. In Game 6 we have replaced the function PRF(m˜s, ·) with a random function. We now want to
make sure, that the Server Finished message still cannot be predicted by an attacker. Remember that the
Server Finished is computed as
fin∗C = F (label4||H(m1|| · · · ||m12)),
where m1|| · · · ||m12 denotes the transcript of all messages sent and received by pis∗i∗ .
Before we can do so, we need to make sure that the only other oracle potentially having access to F ,
which is pit
∗
j∗ , never evaluates the function F on any input label4||H(m′) with
m′ 6= m1|| · · · ||m12 and H(m′) = H(m1|| · · · ||m12).
We now abort the game, if oracle pit
∗
j∗ ever evaluates the conditions hold. Since that directly implies a
collision for the hash function H, we have
Pr[break
(1)
6 ] ≤ Pr[break(1)7 ] + H
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Game 8. Now we use that the full transcript of all messages sent and received (including the tags) is used
to compute the Finished messages, and that Finished messages are computed by evaluating a truly random
function that is only accessible to pis
∗
i∗ and (possibly) pi
t∗
j∗ due to Game 7.
The Finished messages are computed by evaluating a truly random function Fm˜s, so they are completely
independent of the master secret of the current phase. This allows us to show that any adversary has
probability at most 2−µ of learning the Finished messages. We have
Pr[break
(1)
7 ] ≤ Pr[break(1)8 ] +
1
2µ
.
Also note, that leaking the Finished messages now does not reveal any information about this phase to
the adversary.
Game 9. Finally we use that the key material KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac used by pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ in the
stateful symmetric encryption scheme is drawn uniformly at random and independent of all TLS handshake
messages. This game proceeds exactly like the previous game, except that the challenger now aborts if oracle
pis
∗
i∗ accepts without having a matching conversation to pi
t∗
j∗ . Thus we have Pr[break
(1)
9 ] = 0.
The only remaining way for an adversary to make the client oracle pis
∗
i∗ maliciously accept and win is to
output a fresh, valid encryption of the Finished message finS , which must be distinct from the ciphertext
output by pit
∗
j∗ . If the adversary now outputs such a ciphertext, we can directly use it to break the security of
the sLHAE scheme, thus
Pr[break
(1)
8 ] ≤ Pr[break(1)9 ] + sLHAE = sLHAE .
4.2.5 Proof of Lemma 1: server
Proof. We now show that the probability that there exists an oracle with ρ = Server that accepts maliciously
in the sense of Definition 3 is negligible. Let break
(2)
δ be the event that occurs when the first oracle that
accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 3 with ρ = Server in Game δ.
Game 0. This game equals the ACCE security experiment described in Definition 3. Thus, for some server
we have
Pr[break
(2)
0 ] = server .
Game 1. In this game we add an abort rule. The challenger aborts, if there exists any oracle pisi that
chooses a random nonce rC or rS which is not unique. With the same arguments as in Game 1 of the first
proof we have
Pr[break
(2)
0 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)1 ] +
(npanse)
2
2λ
.
Game 2. This game is identical, except for the following. The challenger guesses three random indices
(i∗, s∗) $← [npa]× [nse]. If there exists an oracle pisi that accepts maliciously, and (i, s) 6= (i∗, s∗) and pisi has
ρ 6= Server, then the challenger aborts the game. Note that if the first oracle pisi that accepts maliciously has
ρ = Server, then with probability 1/(npanse) we have (i, s) = (i
∗, s∗), and thus
Pr[break
(2)
1 ] = (npanse) · Pr[break(2)2 ] .
Note that in this game the attacker can only break the security of the protocol if oracle pis
∗
i∗ is the first oracle
that accepts maliciously and has ρ = Server; otherwise the game is aborted.
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Game 3. The challenger proceeds as before, but we add an abort rule. We want to make sure that pis
∗
i∗
receives as input exactly the Diffie–Hellman value m8 = TC that was selected by some other uncorrupted
oracle.
Technically, we abort and raise event abortsig, if oracle pi
s∗
i∗ ever receives as input a message m7 = certC
indicating intended partner Π = j and message m9 = σC = SIG.Sign(skC ,m1‖ . . . , ‖m8) such that σC is a
valid signature but there exists no oracle pitj which has previously output σC . Clearly we have
Pr[break
(2)
2 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)3 ] + Pr[abortsig] .
Note that the experiment is aborted if pis
∗
i∗ does not accept maliciously, due to Game 2. This means that
party Pj must not be corrupted when pi
s∗
i∗ accepts. To show that Pr[abortsig] ≤ (npa) · sig, we construct a
signature forger as follows. The forger receives as input a public key pk∗ and simulates the challenger for A.
It guesses index φ
$← [npa], sets pkφ = pk∗, and generates all long-term public/secret keys as before. Then it
proceeds as the challenger in Game 3, except that it uses its chosen-message oracle to generate a signature
under pkφ when necessary.
If φ = j and the corresponding public key is pkj , which happens with probability 1/(npa), then the forger
can use the signature received by pis
∗
i∗ to break the EUF-CMA security of the signature scheme with success
probability sig, so Pr[abortsig]/(npa) ≤ sig. Therefore if Pr[abortsig] is not negligible, then sig is not negligible
as well and we have
Pr[break
(2)
2 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)3 ] + npasig .
Note that in Game 3 oracle pis
∗
i∗ receives as input a Diffie–Hellman value TC such that TC was chosen in
some phase by another oracle, but not by the attacker. Note also that this phase of this oracle is unique,
since the signature includes the client nonce rC , which is unique due to Game 1. From now on we denote this
unique oracle and phase with pit
∗
j∗ .
Note also that pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ share a premaster secret pms = T
tS
C = T
tC
S , where TC = g
tC and TS = g
tS for
random exponents tS and tC chosen by pi
s∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ , respectively.
Game 4. In this game, we replace the premaster secret pms = gtCtS shared by pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ with a random
value gr, r
$← Zq. The fact that the challenger has full control over the Diffie–Hellman shares TC and TS
exchanged between pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ , due to the modifications introduced in the previous games, provides us with
the ability to prove indistinguishability under the Decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption.
Technically, the challenger in Game 4 proceeds as before, but when pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ compute the premaster
secret as pms = gtCtS , the challenger replaces this value with a uniformly random value p˜ms = gr, r
$← Z∗p,
which is in the following used by both partner oracles.
Suppose there exists an algorithm distinguishing Game 4 from Game 3. Then we can construct an algorithm
B solving the DDH problem as follows. Algorithm B receives as input a DDH challenge (g, gu, gv, gw). The
challenger defines TC := g
u and TS := g
v for the Diffie–Hellman shares chosen by pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ , respectively.
Instead of computing the Diffie–Hellman key as in Game 3, it sets pms = gw both for the client and the
server oracle. Now if w = uv, then this game proceeds exactly like Game 3, while if w is random then this
game proceeds exactly like Game 4. Thus,
Pr[break
(2)
3 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)4 ] + ddh .
Note that in Game 4 the premaster secret of pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ is uniformly random and independent of TC and
TS . This will provide us with the ability to replace the function PRF(p˜ms, ·) with a truly random function in
the next game.
Game 5. In Game 5 we make use of the fact that the premaster secret p˜ms of pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ is chosen
uniformly at random, independently of TC and TS . We thus replace the value ms = PRF(p˜ms, label1‖rC‖rS)
with a random value m˜s.
Distinguishing Game 5 from Game 4 implies an algorithm breaking the security of the pseudorandom
function PRF, thus
Pr[break
(2)
4 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)5 ] + prf .
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Game 6. In this game we replace the function PRF(m˜s, ·) used by pis∗i∗ and pit
∗
j∗ with a random function F .
Of course the same random function is used for both oracles pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ . In particular, this function is used
to compute the Finished messages by both partner oracles.
Distinguishing Game 6 from Game 5 again implies an algorithm breaking the security of the pseudorandom
function PRF, thus
Pr[break
(2)
5 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)6 ] + prf .
Game 7. In Game 6 we have replaced the function PRF(m˜s, ·) with a random function F . We now want to
make sure, that the Client Finished message still cannot be predicted by an attacker. Remember that the
Client Finished is computed as
fin∗S = F (label3||H(m1|| · · · ||m10)),
where m1|| · · · ||m10 denotes the transcript of all messages sent and received by pis∗i∗ .
Before we can do so, we need to make sure that the only other oracle potentially having access to F ,
which is pit
∗
j∗ , never evaluates the function F on any input label3||H(m′) with
m′ 6= m1|| · · · ||m10 and H(m′) = H(m1|| · · · ||m10).
We now abort the game, if oracle pit
∗
j∗ ever evaluates the conditions hold. Since that directly implies a
collision for the hash function H, we have
Pr[break
(2)
6 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)7 ] + H
Game 8. Finally we use that the full transcript of all messages sent and received (including the tags) is
used to compute the Finished messages, and that Finished messages are computed by evaluating a truly
random function that is only accessible to pis
∗
i∗ and (possibly) pi
t∗
j∗ due to Game 7.
The Finished messages are computed by evaluating a truly random function Fm˜s, so they are completely
independent of the master secret of the current phase. This allows us to show that any adversary has
probability at most 2−µ of learning the Finished messages.
Thus we have
Pr[break
(2)
7 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)8 ] +
1
2µ
.
Also note, that leaking the Finished messages now does not reveal any information about this phase to
the adversary.
Game 9. Finally we use that the key material KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac used by pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ in the
stateful symmetric encryption scheme is drawn uniformly at random and independent of all TLS handshake
messages. Thus, this game proceeds exactly like the previous game, except that the challenger now aborts if
oracle pis
∗
i∗ accepts without having a matching conversation to pi
t∗
j∗ . Thus we have Pr[break
(2)
9 ] = 0.
The only remaining way for an adversary to make the server oracle pis
∗
i∗ maliciously accept and win is
to output a fresh, valid encryption of the Client Finished message finC , which must be distinct from the
ciphertext output by pit
∗
j∗ . If the adversary now outputs such a ciphertext, we can directly use it to break the
security of the sLHAE scheme, thus
Pr[break
(2)
8 ] ≤ Pr[break(2)9 ] + sLHAE = sLHAE .
Collecting probabilities of both previous sections yields Lemma 1. We obtain that
auth ≤ client + server
≤ (npanse)
2
2λ−1
+ npanse ·
(
2npasig + ddh + (npanse + 2)
(
PRFODH + prf + H +
1
2µ
+ sLHAE
))
.
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4.2.6 Proof of Confidentiality
Lemma 2. For any adversary A running in time τ ′ ≈ t, the probability that A answers the encryption-
challenge correctly is at most 1/2 + enc with
enc ≤ auth + npanse (ddh + 2prf + sLHAE) ,
where auth is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an oracle that accepts maliciously in the
sense of Definition 3 (cf. Lemma 1) and all other quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 1.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that A always outputs (i, s, b′) such that all conditions in Property 2
of Definition 3 are satisfied. Let break
(3)
δ denote the event that b
′ = b in Game δ, where b is the random bit
sampled by the Test-query, and b′ is either the bit output by A or (if A does not output a bit) chosen by
the challenger. Let Advδ := Pr[break
(3)
δ ]− 1/2 denote the advantage of A in Game δ. Consider the following
sequence of games.
Game 0. This game equals the ACCE security experiment used in Section 4.2.1. For some enc we have
Pr[break
(3)
0 ] =
1
2
+ enc =
1
2
+ Adv0 .
Game 1. The challenger in this game proceeds as before, but it aborts and chooses b′ uniformly random if
there exists any oracle that accepts maliciously in any phase in the sense of Definition 5. Thus we have
Adv0 ≤ Adv1 + auth ,
where auth is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an oracle that accepts maliciously in the
sense of Definition 3 (cf. Lemma 1).
Recall that we assume that A always outputs (i, s, b′) such that all conditions in Property 2 of Definition 3
are satisfied. In particular it outputs (i, s, b′) such that pisi accepts with intended partner Π = j, and Pj is
not corrupted. Note that in Game 1 for any such phase pisi there exists a unique partner phase pi
t
j such that
pisi .phases[1].T has a matching conversation to pi
t
j .phases[1].T , as the game is aborted otherwise.
Game 2. The challenger in this game proceeds as before, but in addition guesses indices (i∗, s∗) $←
[npa]× [nse]. It aborts and chooses b′ at random if the attacker outputs (i, s, b′) with (i, s) 6= (i∗, s∗). With
probability 1/(npanse) we have (i, s) = (i
∗, s∗), and thus
Adv1 ≤ npanseAdv2 .
Note that in Game 2 we know that A will output (i∗, s∗, b′). Note also that pis∗i∗ has a unique partner due
to Game 1. In the sequel we denote with pit
∗
j∗ the unique oracle and phase such that pi
s∗
i∗ has a matching
conversation to pit
∗
j∗ , and say that pi
t∗
j∗ is the partner of pi
s∗
i∗ .
Game 3. The challenger in this game proceeds as before, but replaces the premaster secret pms of pis
∗
i∗
and pit
∗
j∗ with a random group element p˜ms = g
w, w
$← Zq. Note that both gu and gv are chosen by oracles
pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ , respectively, as otherwise pi
s∗
i∗ would not have a matching conversation to pi
t∗
j∗ and the game
would be aborted. Thus, both oracles compute the premaster secret as pms = guv. Let Ti∗,s∗ = g
u denote
the Diffie–Hellman share chosen by pis
∗
i∗ , and let Tj∗,t∗ = g
v denote the share chosen by its partner pit
∗
j∗ .
Suppose that there exists an algorithm A distinguishing Game 3 from Game 2. Then we can construct
an algorithm B solving the DDH problem as follows. B receives as input (g, gu, gv, gw). It implements the
challenger for A as in Game 2, except that it sets Ti∗,s∗ := gu and Tj∗,t∗ := gv, and the premaster secret
of pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ equal to pms := g
w. Note that B can simulate all messages exchanged between pis∗i∗ and pit
∗
j∗
properly, in particular the finished messages using knowledge of pms = gw. Since all other oracles are not
modified, B can simulate these oracles properly as well.
If w = uv, then the view of A when interacting with B is identical to Game 2, while if w $← Zq then it is
identical to Game 3. Thus,
Adv2 ≤ Adv3 + ddh .
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Game 4. In Game 4 we make use of the fact that the premaster secret p˜ms of pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ is chosen
uniformly random. We thus replace the value ms = PRF(p˜ms, label1‖rC‖rS) with a random value m˜s.
Distinguishing Game 4 from Game 3 implies an algorithm breaking the security of the pseudorandom
function PRF, thus
Adv3 ≤ Adv4 + prf .
Game 5. In this game we replace the function PRF(m˜s, ·) used by pis∗i∗ and pit
∗
j∗ with a random function
Fm˜s. Of course the same random function is used for both oracles (in their respective phases) pi
s∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ .
In particular, this function is used to compute the key material as
KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac := Fm˜s(label2‖rC‖rS) .
Distinguishing Game 5 from Game 4 again implies an algorithm breaking the security of the pseudorandom
function PRF. Moreover, in Game 5 the adversary always receives a random key in response to a Test query,
and thus receives no information about b′, which implies Adv5 = 0 and
Adv4 ≤ Adv5 + prf = prf .
Note that in Game 5 the key material KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac of oracles pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ is uniformly
random and independent of all TLS handshake messages exchanged in the pre-accept phase.
Game 6. Now we use that the key material KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac used by pis
∗
i∗ and pi
t∗
j∗ in the
stateful symmetric encryption scheme is drawn uniformly at random and independent of all TLS handshake
messages.
In this game we construct a simulator B that uses a successful ACCE attacker A to break the security
of the underlying sLHAE secure symmetric encryption scheme. By assumption, the simulator B is given
access to an encryption oracle Encrypt and a decryption oracle Decrypt. B embeds the sLHAE experiment by
simply forwarding all Encrypt(pis
∗
i∗ , ·) queries to Encrypt, and all Decrypt(pit
∗
j∗ , ·) queries to Decrypt. Otherwise
it proceeds as the challenger in Game 5.
Observe that the values generated in this game are exactly distributed as in the previous game. We thus
have
Adv5 = Adv6 .
If A outputs a triple (i∗, s∗, b′), then B forwards b′ to the sLHAE challenger. Otherwise it outputs a random
bit. Since the simulator essentially relays all messages it is easy to see that an attacker A having advantage
′ yields an attacker B against the sLHAE security of the encryption scheme with success probability at least
1/2 + ′.
Since by assumption any attacker has advantage at most sLHAE in breaking the sLHAE security of the
symmetric encryption scheme, we have
Adv6 ≤ 1/2 + sLHAE .
Adding up probabilities from Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain that
tls ≤ auth + enc
≤ 2auth + npanse (ddh + 2prf + sLHAE)
≤ (npanse)
2
2λ−2
+ npanse ·
(
4npasig + 3ddh + (npanse + 2)
(
PRFODH + prf + H +
1
2µ
+ sLHAE
))
which yields Theorem 1.
Note, that we do lose some tightness compared to the original ACCE proof of TLS DHE DSS . For the
authentication game, we additionally have to guess the phase in which the adversary makes an oracle
maliciously accept, and for the encryption game we also have to guess the phase to which we input the
challenge keys.
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4.3 TLS with SCSV/RIE is multi-phase-secure
We begin by showing that including the SCSV/RIE countermeasure does not weaken security: putting the
Finished messages in the ClientHello and ServerHello does not introduce any vulnerabilities. Having
done so, in the next subsection we will show how including the SCSV/RIE countermeasure yields a weakly
secure renegotiable ACCE.
Theorem 2. Let Π be a generic tagged TLS ciphersuite as described in Section 4.2. Assume that Π is
(τ, tagged)-tagged-ACCE-fin-secure. Let Π
′ denote Π with SCSV/RIE countermeasures as described in Figure 5.
For any adversary that (τ ′, mp)-breaks the multi-phase ACCE security of Π′ with τ ≈ τ ′, it holds that mp ≤ 2′,
where ′ is obtained from  by replacing all instances of npa in  with npa · nke and replacing all instances of
nse in  with nse · nph. (Recall that npa, nse, nph, and nke are the maximum number of parties, sessions per
party, phases per session, and keypairs per party, respectively.)
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is as follows. We will construct a multi-phase ACCE simulator S for Π′
that makes use of an tagged-ACCE-fin challenger C for Π. S will simulate every (party, public-key) pair and
every (session, phase) pair with distinct parties and sessions in C. For the most part, S will relay queries
down to C and return the result. However, for queries that relate to renegotiation (Send, Decrypt), S needs
to carefully manage the handshake messages and transition one session in C to another.
First, consider when the adversary is causing two honest parties to negotiate their first phase in a session.
The simulator will pass these queries down to the tagged-ACCE-fin challenger and pass the responses back
up to the adversary. Eventually these sessions may switch to using the encrypted channel, in which case the
simulator will also pass the encrypted channel queries down to the tagged-ACCE-fin challenger.
Now the adversary may eventually ask the two honest parties to renegotiate. The simulator will construct
the RIE extension by obtaining the Finished messages issuing a RevealFin query to the tagged-ACCE-fin
challenger. Then the simulator will ask the parties to start a new session with those RIE extension values
as the arbitrary data. Finally, it will encrypt those handshake messages using the Encrypt oracle of the
existing session and give those ciphertexts to the adversary. If the adversary delivers the exact ciphertexts,
then even though the simulator cannot decrypt the ciphertexts it can still carry out the handshake because
it knows they are the right ciphertexts. If the adversary delivers modified ciphertexts, then the simulator
rejects. This is the correct behaviour unless the adversary managed to forge ciphertexts in the underlying
tagged-ACCE-fin.
Second, consider when the adversary is playing the role of a corrupted party with an honest party. In
other words, the adversary has issued a Corrupt query for a long-term key of some party (which the simulator
answered by issuing a Corrupt query to the corresponding party in the tagged-ACCE-fin challenger). For
the initial handshake, the simulator simply relays the handshake messages down to the tagged-ACCE-fin
challenger and returns the responses. However, once the handshake completes, the multi-phase ACCE
simulator has no clue whether a ciphertext it receives contains a data message or a control (handshake)
message, yet it needs to start a new handshake if it receives a control message. Fortunately, as soon as the
initial handshake completes, the multi-phase ACCE simulator can issue a Reveal query to the underlying
session in the ACCE challenger. And because the adversary is the peer in this phase, it will never be a valid
session for the multi-phase ACCE authentication game or the multi-phase ACCE confidentiality/integrity
game, and thus the simulator does not violate any freshness condition in the underlying tagged-ACCE-fin
game by issuing a Reveal query.
The simulator S. The details of the simulation follow. For each (party, public key) pair (A, pk) in the
multi-phase ACCE experiment, S will allocate a distinct party, abstractly denoted A|pk, in the tagged-ACCE-
fin experiment run by C. Similarly, each phase ` in a session s in the multi-phase ACCE experiment will
correspond to a session, abstractly denoted s|`, in the tagged-ACCE-fin experiment.
S answers the adversary’s multi-phase ACCE queries as follows. In all of the following, let ` be the current
phase of pisA, let pk denote pi
s
A.phases[`].pk, pk
∗ denote pisA.phases[`+ 1].pk, and suppose pi
s
A.d = pi
t
B .
• Send(pisA,m): The behaviour of S’s simulator of the Send oracle depends on whether the initial handshake
or a renegotiation is occurring. First we consider the initial handshake:
– If m = (newphase, pk, ω) and pisA.phases is empty: S issues a Send(pis|1A|pk, (newphase, ω, empty))
query to C and returns the result.
25
– If m = (ready, pk, ω) and pisA.phases is empty: S issues a Send(pis|1A|pk, (ready, ω, empty) query to
C; no result is received or returned.
– If m = m1 = (rC , cs-list, extC) in Figure 5, S aborts if extC 6= empty. Otherwise, S sends issues
a Send(pi
s|1
A|pk, (rC , cs-list)) query to C and returns the result.
– Ifm = m2‖ . . . ‖m6 andm2 = (rC , cs-list, extS) in Figure 5, S aborts if extS 6= empty. Otherwise,
S sets m′2 = (rC , cs-list) and issues a Send(pis|1A|pk,m′2‖ . . . ‖m6) query to C and returns the result.
– If m = m7‖ . . . ‖m11 or m = m12‖m13, S relays the query to C and returns the result.
Now consider renegotiation handshakes. For renegotiation handshakes, the only Send queries issued
will involve newphase or ready messages.
– If m = (newphase, pk∗, ω), pisA.phases is not empty, and pi
s
A.ρ = Client: S issues a RevealFin(pis|`A|pk)
query to C to obtain finC‖finS . S starts in phases a new phase ` + 1 of pisA with authentica-
tion mode ω and public key pk∗. S obtains handshake message m∗1 by issuing a Send(pis|`+1A|pk∗ ,
(newphase, ω, finC)) query to C. S then issues an Encrypt(pis|`A|pk, control,m∗1,m∗1, len, hd) query
to C and returns the result.
– If m = (newphase, pk∗, ω), pisA.phases is not empty, and pi
s
A.ρ = Server: S starts in phases a new
phase `+1 of pisA with authentication mode ω and public key pk
∗, sets m∗0 = ServerHelloRequest,
issues an Encrypt(pi
s|`
A|pk, control,m
∗
0,m
∗
0, len, hd) query to C, and returns the result.
– If m = (ready, pk∗, ω) and pisA.phases is not empty: S starts in phases a new phase `+ 1 of pisA
with authentication mode ω and public key pk∗. S issues a RevealFin(pis|`A|pk) query to C to obtain
finC‖finS . S issues a Send(pis|`+1A|pk∗ , (ready, ω, finS)) query to C; no result is received or returned.
The actual handshake messages in renegotiation handshakes are delivered using Decrypt queries.
• Corrupt(PA, pk): S issues a Corrupt(PA|pk) query to C and returns the result.
• Reveal(pisA, `): S issues a Reveal(pis|`A|pk) query to C and returns the result.
• Encrypt(pisA, ctype,m0,m1, len, hd): S aborts if ctype = control. Otherwise, S issues an Encrypt(pis|`A|pk,
m0,m1, len, hd) query to C and returns the result.
• Decrypt(pisA, C, hd): First suppose that all of conditions C2–C5 of Definition 2; namely that neither
the phase’s owner public key pk nor the peer’s public key pk′ has been corrupted, nor have the session
keys been revealed. Now we explain each part of the renegotiation handshake:
– Suppose pisA.ρ = Server and the last query that pi
s
A received was Send(pi
s
A, (ready, . . . )) or Send(pi
s
A,
(newphase, . . . )). If C does not equal the last ciphertext that was sent by pitB, then abort.
Otherwise, S issues a Decrypt(pis|`A|pk, C, hd) query to C. (Note this returns ⊥.) Then S issues a
Send(pi
s|`+1
A|pk∗ ,m
∗
1) query to C, where m∗1 is the handshake message obtained by S from C in the
Send(pitB , (newphase, . . . )) query above. S receives m∗2‖ . . . ‖m∗6 from C, encrypts them by issuing
an Encrypt(pi
s|`
A|pk, control,m
∗
2‖ . . . ‖m∗6, . . . ) query, and returns the resulting ciphertext C ′.3
– Suppose pisA.ρ = Client and the last query that pi
s
A received was Send(pi
s
A, (ready, . . . )). If C
does not equal the last ciphertext that was sent by pitB, then abort. Otherwise, S issues
a Decrypt(pi
s|`
A|pk, C, hd) query to C. (Note this returns ⊥.) Then S issues a Send(pis|`+1A|pk∗ ,
m∗2‖ . . . ‖m∗6) query to C, where m∗2‖ . . . ‖m∗6 are the handshake messages obtained by S from C in the
Decrypt(pitB , . . . ) query in the bullet point immediately preceding this one. S receives m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗11
from C, encrypts m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗10 by issuing an Encrypt(pis|`A|pk, control,m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗10, . . . ) query, and
returns the resulting ciphertext C ′ along with m∗11.
– Suppose pisA.ρ = Server and the last query that pi
s
A received was the Decrypt query in the first
bullet point in this list. If C does not equal the last ciphertext that was sent by pitB, then
abort. Otherwise, S splits the ciphertext as C∗‖m∗11 and issues a Decrypt(pis|`A|pk, C∗, hd) query.
3Note that here, and throughout the Decrypt query, our simulator S is not disadvantaged by its call to C.Decrypt not returning
plaintext because, in this first part, it “knows” what the plaintext handshake message is from having simulated the other side;
and in the second part, it can reveal the session key and become able to decrypt the ciphertext itself.
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(Note this returns ⊥.) Then S issues a Send(pis|`+1A|pk∗ ,m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗11) query to C, where m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗10
are the handshake messages obtained by S from C in the Decrypt(pitB , . . . ) query in the bullet
point immediately preceding this one. S receives m∗12‖m∗13 from C, encrypts m∗12 by issuing an
Encrypt(pi
s|`
A|pk, control,m
∗
12, . . . ) query, and returns the resulting ciphertext C
′ along with m∗13.
– Suppose pisA.ρ = Client and the last query that pi
s
A received was the Decrypt query in the second
bullet point in this list. If C does not equal the last ciphertext that was sent by pitB, then abort.
Otherwise, S splits the ciphertext as C∗‖m∗13 and issues a Decrypt(pis|`A|pk, C∗, hd) query. (Note this
returns ⊥.) Then S issues a Send(pis|`+1A|pk∗ ,m∗12‖ . . . ‖m∗13) query to C, where m∗12 is the handshake
message obtained by S from C in the Decrypt(pitB , . . . ) query in the bullet point immediately
preceding this one.
– All other Decrypt(pisA, . . . ) queries: S issues a Decrypt(pis|`A|pk, C, hd) query to C and returns the
result.
Now suppose otherwise, namely that one or more of conditions C2–C5 of Defintion 2 is violated,
so either the phase owner’s public key pk or the peer’s public key pk′ has been corrupted, or either
Reveal(pitB , `
′) or Reveal(pitB , `
′) has been called.
If it has not already done so, S issues a Reveal(pis|`A|pk) query to C and obtains session key k containing
encryption and MAC keys KC→Senc ||KS→Cenc ||KC→Smac ||KS→Cmac . Using the appropriate encryption key, S
steps through all previous calls to Decrypt(pisA, . . . ) to bring the decryption state std up-to-date. Now
we explain each part of the renegotiation handshake:
– Suppose pisA.ρ = Server and the last query that pi
s
A received was Send(pi
s
A, (ready, . . . )) or Send(pi
s
A,
(newphase, . . . )). S uses KC→Senc and std to decrypt C and obtain m∗1 or ⊥, in which case S
aborts. S issues a Decrypt(pis|`A|pk, C, hd) query to C. (Note this returns ⊥.) Then S issues
a Send(pi
s|`+1
A|pk∗ ,m
∗
1) query to C. S receives m∗2‖ . . . ‖m∗6 from C, encrypts them by issuing an
Encrypt(pi
s|`
A|pk, control,m
∗
2‖ . . . ‖m∗6, . . . ) query, and returns the resulting ciphertext C ′.
– Suppose pisA.ρ = Client and the last query that pi
s
A received was Send(pi
s
A, (ready, . . . )). S uses
KS→Cenc and std to decrypt C and obtain m
∗
2‖ . . . ‖m∗6 or ⊥, in which cases S aborts. S issues a
Decrypt(pi
s|`
A|pk, C, hd) query to C. (Note this returns ⊥.) Then S issues a Send(pis|`+1A|pk∗ ,m∗2‖ . . . ‖m∗6)
query to C. S receives m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗11 from C, encrypts m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗10 by issuing an Encrypt(pis|`A|pk,
control,m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗10, . . . ) query, and returns the resulting ciphertext C ′ along with m∗11.
– Suppose pisA.ρ = Server and the last query that pi
s
A received was the Decrypt query in the first
bullet point in this list. S splits the ciphertext as C∗‖m∗11. S uses KC→Senc and std to decrypt C∗
and obtain m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗10 or ⊥, in which case S aborts. S issues a Decrypt(pis|`A|pk, C∗, hd) query
to C. (Note this returns ⊥.) Then S issues a Send(pis|`+1A|pk∗ ,m∗7‖ . . . ‖m∗11) query to C. S receives
m∗12‖m∗13 from C, encrypts m∗12 by issuing an Encrypt(pis|`A|pk, control,m∗12, . . . ) query, and returns
the resulting ciphertext C ′ along with m∗13.
– Suppose pisA.ρ = Client and the last query that pi
s
A received was the Decrypt query in the second
bullet point in this list. S splits the ciphertext as C∗‖m∗13. S uses KS→Cenc and std to decrypt C∗
and obtain m∗12 or ⊥, in which case S aborts. S issues a Decrypt(pis|`A|pk, C∗, hd) query. (Note this
returns ⊥.) Then S issues a Send(pis|`+1A|pk∗ ,m∗12‖ . . . ‖m∗13) query to C.
– All other Decrypt(pisA, . . . ) queries: S issues a Decrypt(pis|`A|pk, C, hd) query to C and returns the
result.
Correctness of the simulator. The simulation presented by S is perfect except in its handling of Decrypt
queries when the peer’s public key pisA.pk has not been corrupted. During renegotiation, the simulator S
rejects any ciphertext C that is not exactly equal to the ciphertext C(−1) sent by the peer in the previous
query. It is possible that C is in fact a valid ciphertext. However, at the time the improper simulator occurred,
all of conditions C1–C5 of Definition 2 were satisfied. And under the assumption that C is a valid ciphertext,
if S was to make a query Decrypt(pisA, C, hd) to C, then S would receive either ⊥ if C’s secret challenge bit b in
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pi
s|`
A|pk is 0, or m 6= ⊥ if the secret challenge bit b = 1. In other words, S can (τ ′, ′)-break the confidentiality
of Π in the tagged-ACCE-fin experiment, with τ ≈ τ ′ and ′ ≥ tagged.
Attack on a correct simulator. Finally, suppose no failure event happens as described above, and
suppose the adversary breaks the multi-phase ACCE security of Π′. We show how to translate this attack
into an attack on the ACCE-tag-fin security of Π in C.
Confidentiality/integrity. First suppose that the multi-phase ACCE adversary for Π′ succeeds in breaking
confidentiality/integrity (Definition 2), namely by outputting a tuple (A, s, `, b′) for which b′ = pisA.phases[`].b,
and that adversary never violated conditions C1–C6 of Definition 2. Let pk denote pisA.phases[`].pk. Since S
only violates conditions C1–C6 for pi
s|`
A|pk.phases[1] when the adversary violates them for pi
s
A.phases[`], S has
not violated these conditions either. The simulator S outputs the tuple ((A|pk), (s|`), 1, b′); it holds that b′ =
pi
s|`
A|pk.phases[1].b in Π. Thus, we have that S (τ ′, c)-breaks the (tagged-ACCE-fin) confidentiality/integrity
of Π, where τ ≈ τ ′ and c is obtained from  by replacing all instances of npa in  with npa · nke and replacing
all instances of nse in  with nse · nph.
Authentication. Now suppose that the multi-phase ACCE adversary for Π′ succeeds in breaking authenti-
cation (as in Definition 3, namely by causing to exist a phase pisA.phases[`] which has accepted (condition A1),
have not been trivially compromised (conditions A2–A5), and have no phase with a matching handshake
transcript at the peer (condition M). Since S only violates conditions A2, A3, or A5 for pis|`A|pk.phases[1] when
the adversary violates them for pisA.phases[`], S has not violated these conditions either. Moreover, condition
A4 for pi
s|`
A|pk.phases[1] is satisfied precisely when pi
s
A.phases[`] is. Thus, we have that S (τ ′, a)-breaks the
(tagged-ACCE-fin) authentication of Π, where τ ≈ τ ′ and a is obtained from  by replacing npa and nse in 
as in the previous paragraph.
The result follows.
Remark 6. A simulation similar to the one in the proof allows us to prove that TLS with SCSV/RIE
countermeasures is a multi-phase ACCE protocol, even when different ciphersuites are used in different phases.
The simulator interacts with a different tagged-ACCE-fin challenger for each ciphersuite; when a renegotiation
inside one ciphersuite will result in a new ciphersuite, the simulator uses the Encrypt/Decrypt queries in the
old ciphersuite to encrypt the Send messages from the handshake of the new ciphersuite. Unfortunately, for
this multi-ciphersuite simulation to work, it is essential that public keys not be shared across ciphersuites:
this technique could show that switching between an RSA-based ciphersuite and an ECDSA-based ciphersuite
is safe. However, to analyze using the same RSA public key in two different ciphersuites, one would have to
take an alternative approach, as it may not be possible to generically prove that re-using the same public key
in two ACCE protocols is safe.
4.4 TLS with SCSV/RIE is a weakly secure renegotiable ACCE
We are now in a position to show that the use of the SCSV/RIE countermeasure in TLS results in a weakly
secure renegotiable ACCE. We will do so generically, starting from the consequence of the previous theorem:
that TLS with SCSV/RIE is a secure multi-phase ACCE.
Theorem 3. Let Π be a TLS ciphersuite with SCSV/RIE countermeasures, as described in Figure 5. If Π is
a (τ, mp)-secure multi-phase ACCE protocol, and PRF is a (τ, prf)-secure pseudorandom function, then Π is
a (τ, )-weakly secure renegotiable ACCE, with  = mp + prf .
Intuitively, the use of the RIE countermeasure guarantees that each party who renegotiates has the same
view of (a) whether they are renegotiating, and (b) which handshake is the “previous” handshake. We can
chain these together to obtain the property of a secure renegotiable ACCE: parties who renegotiate have the
same view of all previous handshakes. If this is violated, either the non-renegotiable aspects of TLS have
been broken, or a collision has been found in the computation of the renegotiation indication extension.
Proof. Suppose A breaks the weak renegotiable ACCE security of the protocol Π. We will show that either
A breaks the multi-phase ACCE security of Π or A can be used to construct another algorithm that breaks
either the security of the PRF or the multi-phase ACCE security of Π.
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We approach the proof in three cases: either A has broken the confidentiality/integrity of the weakly
secure renegotiable ACCE, or A has broken the weak renegotiation authentication of the weakly secure
renegotiable ACCE, the latter by meeting either condition M′(a) or M′(b).
Confidentiality/integrity. Since the winning conditions for the confidentiality/integrity part of the
security game are the same for both definitions, every adversary who breaks confidentiality/integrity in the
weakly secure renegotiable ACCE security game for Π breaks confidentiality/integrity in the multi-phase
ACCE security game for Π.
Authentication — M′(a). Suppose A wins the weak renegotiable ACCE security experiment for Π using
condition M′(a). Either there is no ` at all such that pitB .phases[`].T matches pi
s
A.phases[`
∗].T , or there is
such an ` but ` 6= `∗.
First consider the case where there is no ` at all such that pitB .phases[`].T matches pi
s
A.phases[`
∗].T . That
meets condition M of Definition 3 for Π.
Now consider the case where there is an ` such that pitB .phases[`].T matches pi
s
A.phases[`
∗].T but ` 6= `∗.
Assume without loss of generality ` < `∗ (otherwise we could swap the oracles).
There must exist some value j ∈ [1, ` − 1] such that pisA.phases[`∗ − j].T 6= pitB .phases[` − j].T . In
particular, j ≤ ` − 1, since in pitB’s first phase its outgoing message m1 contains extC = empty but pisA
received a message m1 with extc 6= empty. Let j be minimal. Then pitB .phases[` − j + 1].T matches
pisA.phases[`
∗ − j + 1].T . In particular, messages m1 of those two transcripts are equal, and so are messages
m2 of those two transcripts. Since RIE is being used, m1 and m2 contain fin
(−1)
C and fin
(−1)
S , and since
pis,`
∗−j+1
A accepted, both pi
s,`∗−j+1
A and pi
t,`−j+1
B used the same fin
(−1)
C and fin
(−1)
S values. But at each party,
fin
(−1)
C and fin
(−1)
S are the hash (using a PRF) of the handshake transcripts from phases pi
s,`∗−j
A and pi
t,`−j
B ,
and we know that these handshake transcripts are not equal. This means a collision has occurred in PRF,
which happens with negligible probability.
Assuming PRF is secure and Π is a secure multi-phase ACCE, no A can achieve conditions M′(a) and
A1–A7.
Authentication — M′(b). Now suppose A wins the weak renegotiable ACCE security experiment for Π
using condition M′(b) but not M′(a). In particular, for every `′ < `∗, pisA.phases[`
′].T = pitB .phases[`
′].T
but there is some ` < `∗ such that pisA.phases[`].RTs‖RTr 6= pitB .phases[`].RTr‖RTs. Choose ` minimal. Let
v be the smallest index such that the vth ciphertext Cv of pi
s
A.phases[`].RTs‖RTr is not equal to the vth
ciphertext of pitB .phases[`].RTr‖RTs.
Assume without loss of generality that Cv was received by pi
s
A as the vth ciphertext but was not sent
by pitB as the vth ciphertext. (The alternative is that Cv was sent by pi
s
A as the vth ciphertext but was not
received by pitB as the vth ciphertext. However, we could then focus on everything from pi
t
B ’s perspective and
apply the same argument.)
This means that when A called Decrypt(pisA, Cv, hd), if b = 0 then Decrypt returned (⊥, ·), whereas if b = 1
then Decrypt returned (m′, ·) where m′ 6=⊥. Our simulator can thus output (A, s, `, b′) for its guess of b′ as
above, and this will equal b with probability at least , making condition C6 hold in Definition 3. We need
to show that conditions C1–C5 also hold for (A, s, `).
Since A wins the weak renegotiable ACCE experiment using condition M′(b), we have that A1–A7 all
hold. We want to show that, at the time that pisA accepted in phase `+ 1, conditions C1–C5 also hold for
(A, s, `).
• C1: A1 implies C1, since if pisA has rejected in any phase prior to `∗ then it would not have a phase `∗.
• C2 and C3: Conditions A2 and A3 of Definition 5 do not imply that A did not ask Corrupt queries
prohibited by C2 and C3. However, we do have that pisA.phases[`].T = pi
t
B .phases[`].T ; in other words,
A was not active in the handshake for phase `. Thus, A is equivalent to an adversary who did not ask
any Corrupt queries for public keys used in phase ` until after pisA accepts in phase `.
• C4: A6 implies C4, at the time that pisA accepted.
• C5: Since pisA chooses nonce rC (if a client) or rS (if a server) randomly, except with negligible
probability there is no `′ < ` such that pisA.phases[`
′].T = pisA.phases[`].T . By A7, A did not issue
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Reveal(pitB , `) before pi
s
A accepted in phase `+ 1. Thus at the time that pi
s
A accepted, A did not issue
Reveal(pitB , `
′) to any phase with pitB .phases[`
′].T = pisA.phases[`].T , satisfying condition C5.
Thus, assuming Π is a secure multi-phase ACCE no A can achieve conditions M′(b) and A1–A7.
We can combine Theorems 2 and 3 to obtain the central results of the paper, justifying the security of the
SCSV/RIE countermeasure:
Corollary 1. If a tagged TLS ciphersuite Π as described in Section 4.2 is a secure tagged-ACCE-fin protocol
and PRF is a secure pseudorandom function, then that TLS ciphersuite Π with SCSV/RIE countermeasures
as described in Figure 5 is a weakly secure renegotiable ACCE.
Corollary 2. Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 1, TLS DHE DSS with SCSV/RIE countermeasures
is a weakly secure renegotiable ACCE protocol.
5 Renegotiation Security of TLS with a New Countermeasure
We now present a new TLS renegotiation countermeasure that provides integrity protection for the record
layer transcript upon renegotiation (even when previous phases’ session keys are leaked while the phase is still
active), thereby achieving the full security of Definition 4. This countermeasure is quite straightforward: by
including a hash of all record layer messages in the renegotiation information extension, parties can confirm
that they share the same view of their previous record layers.
The renegotiation information extension already contains a fingerprint of the previous phrase’s handshake
transcript via the client verify data (fin
(−1)
C ) and server verify data (fin
(−1)
S ) values. We modify the
renegotiation information extension to include an additional value, the fingerprint of the encrypted messages
sent over the previous phase’s record layer. In particular, if negotiating:
extC ← fin(−1)C ‖ PRF(ms(−1), label5‖H(RT (−1)s ‖RT (−1)r )) (1)
where ms(−1) is the previous phase’s master secret, H is a collision-resistant hash function, and RT (−1)s ‖RT (−1)r
is the client’s view of the previous phase’s record layer transcript; the server uses RT
(−1)
r ‖RT (−1)s instead.
Appropriate checks are performed by the server. With this additional information, the two parties will now
not complete renegotiation unless they have matching views of the record layer transcripts from the previous
phase.
Remark 7. Note that the proof does not require the server to also send its view of the record layer transcript;
the server simply checks what it receives from the client and stops if it is not what it expects. The same is
actually true as well of the RIE countermeasure, and the proof of Theorem 3 would go through if only extC
contained fin
(−1)
S . However, if the security model is altered to allow Corrupts of the current phase’s public
keys but not Reveals of the previous phase’s session keys, then having both extC and extS include each party’s
view of the the transcript is required to achieve security.
In practice, it is not difficult to, on an incremental basis, compute hashes of the ciphertexts sent and
received over the record layer in that phase. In particular, it is not necessary to store all record layer
messages to input to the hash function all at once, as common programming APIs for hash functions allow
the hash value to be provided incrementally. However, the cost of the MAC computation can dominate
the cryptographic cost of record layer computations [17]. The new countermeasure is only suitable for TLS
communications over a reliable channel and could not be used with DTLS communications over an unreliable
channel.
Alternatively, if the sLHAE scheme for the record layer is implemented as encrypt-then-MAC or MAC-
then-encrypt, it should be possible to use MAC contained in the last encrypted message of the sLHAE scheme
instead of the hash value computed above; this would result in no additional performance impact and would
be easier to implement.
Theorem 4. Let Π be a TLS ciphersuite with the original RIE countermeasures as in Figure 5 but using
extC as in equation (1). If Π is a (τ, mp)-secure multi-phase ACCE protocol, H is a (τ, h)-collision-resistant
hash function, and PRF is a (τ, prf)-secure pseudorandom function, then Π is a (τ, )-secure renegotiable
ACCE, where  = mp + h + prf .
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The proof proceeds similarly to that of Theorem 3. The main difference is that, in one case, the removal
of restrictions A6 and A7 means we can no longer reduce down to a violation of confidentiality/integrity in
the multi-phase security of Π, and instead have to rely on the new countermeasure to detect non-matching
record layer transcripts and reduce to the security of the PRF and hash function.
Proof. The proof proceeds similarly to that of Theorem 3. Suppose A breaks the renegotiable ACCE security
of the protocol Π. We will show that either A directly breaks the multi-phase ACCE security of Π or A can
be used to construct another algorithm that breaks either the security of the PRF, the collision resistance of
H, or the multi-phase ACCE security of Π.
As before, we approach the proof in three cases: either A has broken the confidentiality/integrity of the
secure renegotiable ACCE, or A has broken the renegotiation authentication of the secure renegotiable ACCE,
and the latter can happen by meeting either condition M′(a) or M′(b). The first two cases, confidentiality
and authentication for M′(a), proceed exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.
Authentication — M′(b). Suppose A wins the renegotiable ACCE security experiment for Π using
condition M′(b) but not M′(a).
When conditions A1–A7 hold, then the same argument as in the proof for case M′(b) of Theorem 3 still
holds, in which case conditions C1–C6 hold and A can be used to break the confidentiality/integrity of Π in
the multi-phase ACCE experiment.
However, in the secure renegotiable ACCE experiment, the adversary is no longer constrained by conditions
A6 and A7, so it can make Reveal queries while the phase is active. This means that conditions C4 and C5
are no longer satisfied, so we cannot reduce to the confidentiality/integrity of Π in the multi-phase ACCE
experiment when such Reveal queries are issued. Instead, we make use of the new countermeasure, and apply
an argument similar to that for case M′(a) of Theorem 3.
IfA wins using condition M′(b) but not M′(a), then, for every `′ < `∗, pisA.phases[`′].T = pitB .phases[`′].T .
But there is some ` < `∗ such that pisA.phases[`].RTs‖RTr 6= pitB .phases[`].RTr‖RTs. Choose ` maximal.
Then pitB .phases[`+ 1].T matches pi
s
A.phases[`+ 1].T . In particular, messages m1 of those two transcripts
are equal, and so are messages m2 of those two transcripts. Since the new countermeasure is being used, m2
contains extC , which contains PRF(ms
(−1), label5‖H(RT (−1)s ‖RT (−1)r )). Since pis,`+1A accepted, both pis,`+1A
and pit,`+1B used the same value in extC . But at each party, this value is the value of the PRF applied to the
hash of the record layer transcripts from phases pis,`A and pi
t,`
B , which we know are not equal. This means a
collision has occurred either in H or PRF, which happens with negligible probability.
Thus, assuming PRF is secure, H is collision-resistant, and Π is a secure multi-phase ACCE, no A can
achieve conditions M′(a) and A1–A5.
6 Conclusion
Although two-party protocols for establishing secure communication have been extensively studied in the
literature and are widely used in practice, this is the first work to consider the important practical issue of
renegotiation, in which parties update one or more aspects of their connection — authentication credentials,
cryptographic parameters, or simply refresh their session key. The importance of correctly implementing
renegotiation was highlighted by the 2009 attack of Ray and Dispensa on how certain applications process
data from renegotiable TLS connections.
We have developed a formal model for describing the security of renegotiable cryptographic protocols,
focussing on authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocols. We have specifically
analyzed renegotiation in the TLS protocol, identifying the original attack of Ray and Dispensa in our
model. We have provide a generic proof that the SCSV/RIE countermeasure offers good protection against
renegotiation attacks, and give a new countermeasure that provides renegotiation security even in the face of
slightly stronger adversaries. In practice, the SCSV/RIE countermeasure may be good enough.
Renegotiation, reauthentication, and rekeying are important features of many other applied cryptographic
protocols. Future applied work includes examining the security of rekeying in protocols such as SSH or IKEv2
in our model. Open theoretical questions include how to adapt our approach for defining secure renegotiation
to other primitives, in particular authenticated key exchange protocols. The overall security of TLS still has
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many important open questions, including the security of other TLS ciphersuites and the formal analysis of
other complex functionality such as alerts and error messages. TLS session resumption [11, §F.1.4] is another
important functionality of TLS, and it appears that our multi-phase ACCE model may be the right model in
which to analyze its security, another interesting open problem. Given that attacks continue to be found
outside the core key agreement component of TLS, further research into modelling the security of TLS in
increasingly realistic scenarios is well-motivated.
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A Additional Definitions
A.1 Matching Conversations
Bellare and Rogaway [2] introduced the notion of matching conversations to help define correctness and
security of an AKE protocol. Later Jager et al. [18, 19] modified the original definition to take into account
which party sent the last message. The asymmetry of the definition — the fact that we have to distinguish
33
which party has sent the last message — is necessary since protocol messages may be sent sequentially. For
instance, in the TLS handshake protocol (see Figure 4) the last message the client sends is the ‘client finished’
message finC , and then it waits for the ‘server finished’ message finS before acceptance. The server, however,
sends finS after receiving finC . Therefore the server has to accept without knowing whether its last message
was received by the client correctly. Since an active adversary may simply drop the last protocol message,
this must be considered in the definition of matching conversations.
Definition 6 (Matching conversations). Let transcripts TA and TB be two sequences of messages sent and
received, in chronological order, by parties PA and PB respectively. We say that TA is a prefix of TB, if
TA contains at least one message, and the messages in TA are identical to and in the same order as the
first |TA| messages of TB. We say that transcript TA is a matching conversation to TB if (i) TB is a pre-
fix of TA and party PA has sent the last message(s), or (ii) TA = TB and party PB has sent the last message(s).
We say that TA and TB are matching conversations, if TA is a matching conversation to TB and vice versa.
Likewise we say that PA and PB have matching conversations, if TA and TB are matching conversations.
A.2 Stateful Length-Hiding Authenticated Encryption (sLHAE)
Length-hiding authenticated encryption (LHAE) was originally introduced by Paterson et al. [28]. Here we
describe the variant stateful LHAE (sLHAE), stated by Jager et al. [18].
A stateful symmetric encryption scheme is a pair of algorithms StE = (StE.Enc,StE.Dec). Algorithm
(C, st′e)
$← StE.Enc(k, len, hd,m, ste) takes as input a secret key k ∈ {0, 1}κ, an output ciphertext length
len ∈ N, some header data hd ∈ {0, 1}∗, a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and the current state ste ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
outputs a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1}∗ and an updated state st′e. Algorithm (m′, st′d) = StE.Dec(k, hd, C, std) takes
as input a key k, header data hd, a ciphertext C, and the current state std ∈ {0, 1}∗, and returns an updated
state st′d and a value m
′ which is either the message encrypted in C, or a distinguished error symbol ⊥
indicating that C is not a valid ciphertext. Both encryption state ste and decryption state std are initialized
to the empty string ∅. Algorithm StE.Enc may be probabilistic, while StE.Dec is always deterministic.
Definition 7. A stateful symmetric encryption scheme StE = (StE.Enc,StE.Dec) is (τ, sLHAE)-secure, if
Pr[b = b′] ≤ sLHAE for all adversaries A running in time at most τ in the following experiment:
1. Choose b
$← {0, 1} and k $← {0, 1}κ, and set ste ← ∅ and std ← ∅.
2. Run b′ $← AEncrypt,Decrypt.
Oracle Encrypt(m0,m1, len, hd) takes as input two messages m0 and m1 and a length len, and keeps a counter
i which is initialized to 0. Oracle Decrypt(C, hd) takes as input a ciphertext C and header hd, and keeps a
counter j and a switch diverge, both initialized to 0. Both oracles proceed as defined in Figure 3.
This behaviour of the Decrypt oracle in this combined definition for confidentiality and integrity can be
somewhat difficult to understand, so we give a brief explanation. From a high level, when b = 0, the adversary
always receives ⊥ from Decrypt queries. When b = 1, if the adversary successfully manipulates the integrity
of the scheme — either by injecting a new valid ciphertext or messing around with the order of ciphertexts
but still getting them to successfully decrypt — then Decrypt outputs the message m which is not equal to ⊥,
so the adversary learns that b = 1 not 0.
Note that diverge is stateful, so if it is ever set to 1 it remains 1. If the adversary ever calls Decrypt with
“not just the next ciphertext sent by the other party”, then diverge is set. In other words, if the adversary
tries to inject a new ciphertext, or mess around with the order in which ciphertexts are delivered, diverge
is set. In an ideal stateful encryption scheme, decryption should now fail. But if decryption succeeds, the
adversary receives something other than ⊥ (when b = 1), allowing it to learn the challenge bit b, and thus
the scheme should be considered insecure.
A.3 The PRF-Oracle-Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The PRF-Oracle-Diffie-Hellman (PRFODH) assumption presented by Jager et al. [18] is a variant of the
ODH assumption introduced by Abdalla, Bellare and Rogaway [1], adapted from hash functions to PRFs.
Jager et al. allow a single oracle query, in contrast to a polynomial number of queries as in the original
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Encrypt(m0,m1, len, hd): Decrypt(C, hd):
1. i← i+ 1 1. j ← j + 1
2. (C(0), st
(0)
e )
$← StE.Enc(k, len, hd,m0, ste) 2. (m, std) = StE.Dec(k, hd, C, std)
3. (C(1), st
(1)
e )
$← StE.Enc(k, len, hd,m1, ste) 3. If (j > i) or (C 6= Cj), then diverge← 1
4. If (C(0) = ⊥) or (C(1) = ⊥), then return ⊥ 4. If (b = 1) and (diverge = 1), then return m
5. (Ci, ste)← (C(b), st(b)e ) 5. Else return ⊥
6. Return Ci
Figure 3: Encrypt and Decrypt oracles in the stateful LHAE security experiment.
assumption [1]. Abdalla et al. point out that the ODH assumption is heuristically reasonable: in the random
oracle model, the strong DH assumption implies the ODH assumption.
Let G be a group with generator g. Let PRF be a deterministic function PRF : G × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}µ.
Consider the following security experiment played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
1. The adversary A outputs a value m.
2. The challenger chooses u, v ∈ [1, q], sets z0 = PRF(guv,m) and samples z1 ∈ {0, 1}µ uniformly at
random. Then it tosses a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and returns (zb, gu, gv) to the adversary.
3. The adversary may query a pair (X,m′) with X 6= gu to the challenger. The challenger replies with
PRF(Xv,m′).
4. Finally the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 8. We say that the PRFODH problem is (τ, prfodh)-hard with respect to G and PRF, if for all
adversaries A that run in time τ it holds that |Pr [b = b′]− 1/2| ≤ prfodh.
B Protocols without Forward Security
The ACCE notion of Jager et al. [18] requires confidentiality/integrity of ciphertexts to hold even when the
long-term secret keys are corrupted after the handshake completes. As a result, RSA key transport-based
ciphersuites cannot be proven secure in this model: they do not have forward security, since corrupting the
long-term secret keys allows the adversary to compute the session key.
It is plausible that a non-forward-secure notion of ACCE could be defined in which an RSA key transport-
based ciphersuite could be proven secure. While that is beyond the scope of this document, we do comment
on how the notions we have introduced in this paper may be modified to consider protocols without forward
security.
B.1 Model
For renegotiation authentication, public keys used in phase ` cannot be Corrupted while the post-accept
stage of phase ` is still active, as it could allow the adversary to compute the session key and thus inject
messages undetectably. One could add the following restrictions to Def. 5 to consider protocols without
forward security:
A7. A did not query Corrupt(PA, pisA.phases[`].pk) before pisA accepted in phase `+ 1, for every ` < `∗; and
A8. A did not query Corrupt(PB , pisA.phases[`].pk′) before pisA accepted in phase ` + 1, for every ` < `∗,
where pisA.d = pi
t
B .
For confidentiality/integrity, public keys used in phase ` can never be Corrupted, as it could allow the
adversary to compute the session key and distinguish ciphertexts. One could replace the following restrictions
in Def. 2 to consider protocols without forward security:
C2′. A did not query Corrupt(PA, pisA.phases[`].pk); and
C3′. A did not query Corrupt(PB , pisA.phases[`].pk′).
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B.2 On Renegotiation Security of TLS RSA with SCSV/RIE
As mentioned in Section 2, TLS ciphersuites without forward security, such as RSA key transport, cannot be
proven to be secure ACCE protocols, since the compromise of a party’s long-term secret key after the phase
accepts allows the adversary to compute the master secret. Hence RSA key transport-based ciphersuites
can also not be shown to be secure or weakly secure renegotiable ACCE protocols. However, it is plausible
that the ACCE definition can be modified to consider protocols without forward security, in which case RSA
key transport may be able to proven secure. In such a scenario, it should be possible to show that such
ciphersuites, when using SCSV/RIE, also satisfy a non-forward-secure notion of weak renegotiation security;
or when using the new countermeasure in Section 5, also satisfy a non-forward-secure notion of renegotiation
security.
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C TLS DHE DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA Protocol with Renegotiation
Extensions
C S
(IC = pkC , skC) (IS = pkS , skS)pre-accept stage
rC
r←− {0, 1}λ1
†extC ←
{
empty, if initial,
fin
(−1)
C , if reneg
m1 : rC , cs-list,
†extC
rS
r←− {0, 1}λ1
†If extC 6= fin(−1)C : α← reject
†extS ←
{
empty, if initial,
fin
(−1)
C ‖fin(−1)S , if reneg
tS
r←− Zq, TS = gtS mod p
σS ← SIG.Sign(skS , rC‖rS‖p‖g‖TS)
m2 : rS , sid, cs-choice,
†extS
m3 : certS
m4 : p, g, TS , σS
m5 : get-cert
m6 : done
†If extS 6= fin(−1)C ‖fin(−1)S : α← reject
If SIG.Vfy(pkS , σS , rC‖rS‖p‖g‖TS) = 0 : α← reject
tC
r← Zq, TC = gtC mod p
σC ← SIG.Sign(skC ,m1‖ . . . ‖m8)
pms← T tCS mod p
ms← PRF(pms, label1‖rC‖rS)
KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac ← PRF(ms, label2‖rC‖rS)
finC ← PRF(ms, label3‖H(m1‖ . . . ‖m10))
†store fin(−1)C ← finC
m7 : certC
m8 : TC
m9 : σC
m10 : flagenc
m11 : (C11, ste) = StE.Enc(K
C→S
enc ‖KC→Smac , `,H, finC , ste)
If SIG.Vfy(pkC , σC ,m1‖ . . . ‖m8) = 0 : α← reject
pms← T tSC mod p
ms← PRF(pms, label1‖rC‖rS)
KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac ← PRF(ms, label2‖rC‖rS)
If finC 6= PRF(ms, label3‖H(m1‖ . . . ‖m10)) : α← reject
finS ← PRF(ms, label4‖H(m1‖ . . . ‖m12))
†store fin(−1)S ← finS
†store fin(−1)C ← finC
α← accept
m12 : flagenc
m13 : (C13, ste) = StE.Enc(K
S→C
enc ‖KS→Cmac , `,H, finS , ste)
If finS 6= PRF(ms, label4‖H(m1‖ . . . ‖m12)) : α← reject
†store fin(−1)S ← finS
α← accept
post-accept stage
StE.Enc(KC→Senc ‖KC→Smac , `,H, data, ste)
StE.Enc(KS→Cenc ‖KS→Cmac , `,H, data, ste)
Figure 4: TLS handshake for TLS DHE DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA ciphersuite with client authentication
†and SCSV / RIE renegotiation countermeasures
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D Generic TLS Protocol with Renegotiation Extensions
C S
(IC = pkC , skC) (IS = pkS , skS)pre-accept stage
rC
r←− {0, 1}λ1
†extC ←
{
empty, if initial,
fin
(−1)
C , if reneg
m1 : rC , cs-list,
†extC
rS
r←− {0, 1}λ1
†If extC 6= fin(−1)C : α← reject
†extS ←
{
empty, if initial,
fin
(−1)
C ‖fin(−1)S , if reneg
keyexS ← . . .
m2 : rS , sid, cs-choice,
†extS
m3 : certS
m4 : keyexS
m5 : get-cert
m6 : done
†If extS 6= fin(−1)C ‖fin(−1)S : α← reject
If ¬verify(keyexS) : α← reject
keyexC ← . . .
σC ← SIG.Sign(skC ,m1‖ . . . ‖m8)
pms← . . .
ms← PRF(pms, label1‖rC‖rS)
KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac ← PRF(ms, label2‖rC‖rS)
finC ← PRF(ms, label3‖H(m1‖ . . . ‖m10))
†store fin(−1)C ← finC m7 : certC
m8 : keyexC
m9 : σC
m10 : flagenc
m11 : (C11, ste) = StE.Enc(K
C→S
enc ‖KC→Smac , `, hd, finC , ste)
If SIG.Vfy(pkC , σC ,m1‖ . . . ‖m8) = 0 : α← reject
pms← . . .
ms← PRF(pms, label1‖rC‖rS)
KC→Senc ‖KS→Cenc ‖KC→Smac ‖KS→Cmac ← PRF(ms, label2‖rC‖rS)
If finC 6= PRF(ms, label3‖H(m1‖ . . . ‖m10)) : α← reject
finS ← PRF(ms, label3‖H(m1‖ . . . ‖m12))
†store fin(−1)S ← finS
†store fin(−1)C ← finC
α← acceptm12 : flagenc
m13 : (C13, ste) = StE.Enc(K
S→C
enc ‖KS→Cmac , `, hd, finS , ste)
If finS 6= PRF(ms, label3‖H(m1‖ . . . ‖m12)) : α← reject
†store fin(−1)S ← finS
α← accept post-accept stage
StE.Enc(KC→Senc ‖KC→Smac , `, hd, data, ste)
StE.Enc(KS→Cenc ‖KS→Cmac , `, hd, data, ste)
Figure 5: Generic TLS handshake protocol with †SCSV/RIE renegotiation countermeasures
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